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#### Independently, breaking a NEW K AFF destroys engagement. Even if we can debate them on an undisclosed topical aff or a previously run critical aff, the combination is impossible.

#### An open model creates the best politics and arguments

Torvalds and Diamond ‘1

[Linus (Creator of Linux) and David (freelance contributor to the New York Times and Business Week); “Why Open Source Makes Sense”; Educause Review; November/December; p. 71-2 //nick]

It's the best illustration of the limitless benefits to be derived from the open source philosophy. While the PC wasn't developed using the open source model, it is an example of a technology that was opened for any person or company to clone and improve and sell. In its purest form, the open source model allows anyone to participate in a project's development or commercial exploitation. Linux is obviously the most successful example. What started out in my messy Helsinki bedroom has grown to become the largest collaborative project in the history of the world. It began as an ideology shared by software developers who believed that computer source code should be shared freely, with the General Public License - the anticopyright - as the movement's powerful tool. It evolved to become a method for the continuous development of the best technology. And it evolved further to accept widespread market acceptance, as seen in the snowballing adoption of Linux as an operating system for web servers, and in its unexpectedly generous IPOs. What was inspired by ideology has proved itself as technology and is working in the marketplace. Now open source expanding beyond the technical and business domains. At Harvard University Law School, professors Larry Lessig (who is now at Stanford) and Charles Nesson have brought the open source model to law. They started the Open Law Project, which relies on volunteer lawyers and law students posting opinions and research on the project's Web site to help develop arguments and briefs challenging the United States Copyright Extension Act. The theory is that the strongest arguments will be developed when the largest number of legal minds are working on a project, and as a mountain of information is generated through postings and repostings. The site nicely sums up the trade off from the traditional approach: "**What we lose in secrecy, we expect to regain in depth of sources and breadth of argument."** (Put in another context: With a million eyes, all software bugs will vanish.) It's a wrinkle on how academic research has been conducted for years, but one that makes sense on a number of fronts. Think of how this approach could speed up the development of cures for diseases, for example. Or how, with the best minds on the task, international diplomacy could be strengthened. As the world becomes smaller, as the pace of life and business intensifies, and as the technology and information become available, people realise the tight-fisted approach is becoming increasingly outmoded. The theory behind open source is simple. In the case of an operating system - is free. Anyone can improve it, change it, exploit it. But those improvements, changes and exploitations have to be made freely available. Think Zen. The project belongs to no one and everyone. When a project is opened up, there is rapid and continual improvement. With teams of contributors working in parallel, the results can happen far more speedily and successfully than if the work were being conducted behind closed doors. That's what we experienced with Linux. Imagine: Instead of a tiny cloistered development team working in secret, you have a monster on your side. Potentially millions of the brightest minds are contributing to the project, and are supported by a peer-review process that has no, er, peer.

The first time people hear about the open source approach, it sounds ludicrous. That's why it has taken years for the message of its virtues to sink in. Ideology isn't what has sold the open source model. It started gaining attention when it was obvious that open source was the best method of developing and improving the highest quality technology. And now it is winning in the marketplace, an accomplishment has brought open source its greatest acceptance. Companies were able to be created around numerous value-added services, or to use open source as a way of making a technology popular. When the money rolls in, people get convinced. One of the least understood pieces of the open source puzzle is how so many good programmers would deign to work for absolutely no money. A word about motivation is in order. In a society where survival is more or less assured, money is not the greatest of motivators. It's been well established that folks do their best work when they are driven by a passion. When they are having fun. This is as true for playwrights and sculptors and entrepreneurs as it is for software engineers. The open source model gives people the opportunity to live their passion. To have fun and to work with the world's best programmers, not the few who happen to be employed by their company. Open source developers strive to earn the esteem of their peers. That's got to be highly motivating.

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#### The aff commodifies the suffering of \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ in exchange for your ballot in the debate economy---playing a game where we move scenarios of suffering around like chess pieces for our own personal enjoyment is the most unethical form of intellectual imperialism

Baudrillard 94 [Jean, “The Illusion of the End” p. 66-71]

We have long denounced the capitalistic, economic exploitation of the poverty of the 'other half of the world' [['autre monde]. We must today denounce the moral and sentimental exploitation of that poverty - charity cannibalism being worse than oppressive violence. The extraction and humanitarian reprocessing of a destitution which has become the equivalent of oil deposits and gold mines. The extortion of the spectacle of poverty and, at the same time, of our charitable condescension: a worldwide appreciated surplus of fine sentiments and bad conscience. We should, in fact, see this not as the extraction of raw materials, but as a waste-reprocessing enterprise. Their destitution and our bad conscience are, in effect, all part of the waste-products of history- the main thing is to recycle them to produce a new energy source.¶ We have here an escalation in the psychological balance of terror. World capitalist oppression is now merely the vehicle and alibi for this other, much more ferocious, form of moral predation. One might almost say, contrary to the Marxist analysis, that material exploitation is only there to extract that spiritual raw material that is the misery of peoples, which serves as psychological nourishment for the rich countries and media nourishment for our daily lives. The 'Fourth World' (we are no longer dealing with a 'developing' Third World) is once again beleaguered, this time as a catastrophe-bearing stratum. The West is whitewashed in the reprocessing of the rest of the world as waste and residue. And the white world repents and seeks absolution - it, too, the waste-product of its own history.¶ The South is a natural producer of raw materials, the latest of which is catastrophe. The North, for its part, specializes in the reprocessing of raw materials and hence also in the reprocessing of catastrophe. Bloodsucking protection, humanitarian interference, Medecins sans frontieres, international solidarity, etc. The last phase of colonialism: the New Sentimental Order is merely the latest form of the New World Order. Other people's destitution becomes our adventure playground . Thus, the humanitarian offensive aimed at the Kurds - a show of repentance on the part of the Western powers after allowing Saddam Hussein to crush them - is in reality merely the second phase of the war, a phase in which charitable intervention finishes off the work of extermination. We are the consumers of the ever delightful spectacle of poverty and catastrophe, and of the moving spectacle of our own efforts to alleviate it (which, in fact, merely function to secure the conditions of reproduction of the catastrophe market ); there, at least, in the order of moral profits, the Marxist analysis is wholly applicable: we see to it that extreme poverty is reproduced as a symbolic deposit, as a fuel essential to the moral and sentimental equilibrium of the West.¶ In our defence, it might be said that this extreme poverty was largely of our own making and it is therefore normal that we should profit by it. There can be no finer proof that the distress of the rest of the world is at the root of Western power and that the spectacle of that distress is its crowning glory than the inauguration, on the roof of the Arche de la Defense, with a sumptuous buffet laid on by the Fondation des Droits de l'homme, of an exhibition of the finest photos of world poverty. Should we be surprised that spaces are set aside in the Arche d' Alliance. for universal suffering hallowed by caviar and champagne? Just as the economic crisis of the West will not be complete so long as it can still exploit the resources of the rest of the world, so the symbolic crisis will be complete only when it is no longer able to feed on the other half's human and natural catastrophes (Eastern Europe, the Gulf, the Kurds, Bangladesh, etc.). We need this drug, which serves us as an aphrodisiac and hallucinogen. And the poor countries are the best suppliers - as, indeed, they are of other drugs. We provide them, through our media, with the means to exploit this paradoxical resource, just as we give them the means to exhaust their natural resources with our technologies. Our whole culture lives off this catastrophic cannibalism, relayed in cynical mode by the news media, and carried forward in moral mode by our humanitarian aid, which is a way of encouraging it and ensuring its continuity, just as economic aid is a strategy for perpetuating under-development. Up to now, the financial sacrifice has been compensated a hundredfold by the moral gain. But when the catastrophe market itself reaches crisis point, in accordance with the implacable logic of the market, when distress becomes scarce or the marginal returns on it fall from overexploitation, when we run out of disasters from elsewhere or when they can no longer be traded like coffee or other commodities, the West will be forced to produce its own catastrophe for itself , in order to meet its need for spectacle and that voracious appetite for symbols which characterizes it even more than its voracious appetite for food. It will reach the point where it devours itself. When we have finished sucking out the destiny of others, we shall have to invent one for ourselves. The Great Crash, the symbolic crash, will come in the end from us Westerners, but only when we are no longer able to feed on the hallucinogenic misery which comes to us from the other half of the world.¶ Yet they do not seem keen to give up their monopoly. The Middle East, Bangladesh, black Africa and Latin America are really going flat out in the distress and catastrophe stakes, and thus in providing symbolic nourishment for the rich world. They might be said to be overdoing it: heaping earthquakes, floods, famines and ecological disasters one upon another, and finding the means to massacre each other most of the time. The 'disaster show' goes on without any let-up and our sacrificial debt to them far exceeds their economic debt. The misery with which they generously overwhelm us is something we shall never be able to repay. The sacrifices we offer in return are laughable (a tornado or two, a few tiny holocausts on the roads, the odd financial sacrifice) and, moreover, by some infernal logic, these work out as much greater gains for us, whereas our kindnesses have merely added to the natural catastrophes another one immeasurably worse: the demographic catastrophe, a veritable epidemic which we deplore each day in pictures.

#### And---they are the brokers of trauma on the academic market

Colvin 6 (chris, medical anthropologist and works as Senior Research Officer in Social Sciences and HIV/AIDS, TB and STIs with the Infectious Disease Epidemiology Unit in the School of Public Health and Family Medicine at the University of Cape Town, PhD Candidate at UVA dept of Anthro, Trafficking trauma: Intellectual property rights and the political economy of traumatic storytelling, SSN 0256 004 Online 1992-6049 pp. 171–182)

This article begins with a brief look at Khulumani Support Group, a support group for victims of apartheid-era human rights abuses. After apartheid, after the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), these victims were still busy producing the stuff of dramatic public and personal memories. Though there were a range of actors involved in soliciting, promoting, circulating and consuming these stories of trauma, it is the global brokers of traumatic memory – the students and professors, the journalists, the documentary filmmakers, the visiting priests, politicians and psychologists – in whom I am most interested. As I worked with Khulumani, a name for this process of painful, repeated narrativisation about the past presented itself – traumatic storytelling – and an image of the routes of these narratives, the transactions involved, the sites and meanings of consumption took shape in the form of the metaphor of political economy. This political economy of traumatic storytelling was a frequent topic of conversation and controversy among group members, who had grown skeptical of the benefits of participating in this global flow of narrative. This article sketches an outline of this political economy of traumatic storytelling, raises questions about intellectual property rights in the circulation and consumption of traumatic narratives, and explores the recent, ambivalent moves by Khulumani to take back some control over these valued, circulating narrative objects. ¶ Signs of injury’ in circulation In the past two decades, the scope of intellectual property law has been greatly expanded to include a variety of objects, images and ideas that might be called ‘cultural property’ (Handler 2003). Songs, artworks, stories, graphic designs, totems and ritual artefacts have increasingly been brought under the umbrella of a variety of ‘rights regimes’ that seek to protect the rights, especially of marginalised indigenous groups, to maintain control over, and benefit materially from these ‘objects/products’ of their culture (Berryman 1994; Boyle 1996). This article considers a particular – and perhaps peculiar – cultural phenomenon that is only now beginning to emerge as a form of intellectual property in need of ‘protection’. Traumatic storytelling is an increasingly common activity in post-conflict, democratising societies, an activity that produces an ever-expanding volume of narratives of traumatic suffering and recovery. These narratives, solicited by truth commissions, journalists, academics and therapists, now circulate the world through particular relations of production, exchange and consumption and structure what I describe below as a ‘global political economy of traumatic storytelling’. Some victim storytellers in South Africa are pushing for the recognition of these stories as a form of intellectual property and are seeking a range of protections against the manipulation and marketisation of their stories of abuse. How this situation came about and what it might mean for the public sphere’s engagement with images and narratives of abuse, are the subjects of this article.¶ My first encounter with these disillusioned ‘victims of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC)’, as they sometimes identified themselves, came through the monthly meetings of the Khulumani Support Group, a victim support and advocacy group in Cape Town. Khulumani is composed of victims of apartheid-era political violence and the Cape Town group was started in coordination with the Cape Town Trauma Centre, a non-governmental organisation (NGO) offering trauma debriefing and counselling to victims of political and criminal violence. The group arose out of monthly meetings that the Trauma Centre and Khulumani held jointly to provide advocacy services to victims and to gently introduce them to the principles and benefits of counselling (Harper and Colvin 2000). Part of every monthly meeting is devoted to ‘storytelling’. At each meeting there are typically between three and seven speakers. The stories are usually short, and the speakers are calm and measured in their narration. They begin with a brief introduction, continue through a summary of key events and people and end with a comment on how they are doing today. These stories are ‘tight’, reduced to the essential elements needed to make a point. During the storytelling there is little intervention from the facilitators. After the story, a facilitator will offer some very quick comments about the psychological experiences of the speaker and audience. After these brief comments, the floor is reopened and new speakers come forward until the time is up.¶ The process of storytelling in these meetings reflects both the model of memory laid out by the TRC as well as some of the features of what Levy and Sznaider (2002) termed ‘cosmopolitan memory’: stories of traumatic suffering, reduced to the most important, shocking and morally obvious details of harm, circulated less as specific histories in need of specific interventions or response but more as ‘signs of injury, symbols of the moral bankruptcy of apartheid and the means of group identity formation through a common rejection of apartheid morality. ¶ Elsewhere, I describe the narrative work of victims as ‘traumatic storytelling’ (Colvin 2004). I use this term to underscore three characteristic dimensions of the particular kind of storytelling in which I am interested. First, it is storytelling specifically about trauma, the traumas of apartheid in particular. It is a kind of storytelling that does not easily admit the ambiguous or the unspectacular. Second, it is storytelling framed through the psychotherapeutic language of trauma. In particular, it is storytelling that typically narrates the conventional psychodynamic stages of trauma: traumatic event followed by, in various combinations, numbness, intrusion, denial, anxiety, a narrative ‘working through’ and, finally, acceptance and integration through storytelling. Third, it is a kind of storytelling that can itself be traumatic for the teller. The TRC’s investment in traumatic storytelling was in part a manifestation of the broader globalisation of psychiatric knowledge about trauma (Breslau 2000). Traumatic storytelling was not only something that was ‘of the moment’ in global forms of popular culture – on middle-class talk shows, magazines and movies. It also was (and remains) a practice sustained by a range of political, institutional and individual advocates. There is a large and growing network of ‘trauma centers’ throughout the world (Summerfield 1999). Globalising forms of trauma discourse and practice also run parallel with globalising forms of political intervention. Peacekeeping troops, conflict resolution experts, diplomats, scholars of democratisation – all can often be found in the same hot spots of post-conflict intervention as trauma counsellors and debriefers. These experts at political and psychic reconstruction are inevitably accompanied by journalists and researchers who are eager to report on the latest forms of post-conflict healing and keen to circulate the latest stories of traumatic violence. They reproduce these traumatic stories and circulate them globally for consumption by a diverse array of audiences. Taken together these diffuse actors, institutions and interests – and the narratives of suffering that are produced, circulated and consumed – form a global network for the circulation of traumatic storytelling. This wide circuit of narrative flow is sustained by a constant stream of journalists, researchers, politicians, priests and psychologists who fly to the next hot spot – today South Africa, tomorrow Iraq – asking permission to record, interpret and circulate ‘victims’ stories’.¶ These stories were circulated beyond the spaces of monthly meetings and interview rooms, into other countries, other cultures and other histories that were largely unknown to group members.1 Khulumani members had a keen sense of this wide-ranging flow of their narratives. They often spoke to me – sometimes with pride and sometimes with frustration and suspicion – about the fact that people in the United States of America, the Netherlands, England, Sweden, Denmark and ‘even the Ivory Coast’ knew their story. These lines of narrative circulation were often described in great detail. Two group members, Monwabisi and Thembile, both clearly remembered every interview and informal encounter they had had with foreign researchers. When I knew the researcher as well, Monwa and Thembile would frequently ask if I had heard from them, if they had produced something with their stories and if other people were learning about Khulumani and the situation of victims in South Africa. ¶ Anxieties of alienation: Commodifying the signs of injury As their stories are increasingly documented and circulated within widening global circuits of media, academic and activist knowledge production, group members are increasingly anxious and frustrated with the personal and political implications of storytelling. They say that they, the victims, should not have to do so much work for so little gain. Traumatic storytelling has not brought them reparations, it has not eased their poverty, it has not forced perpetrators to confess or beneficiaries to admit their own liability. Only on occasion has it seemed to ease the psychological effects of trauma. More often than not, after the brief ‘intervention’ – at the TRC or monthly meeting – they are left to go home alone, with little follow-up support.¶ The various criticisms levelled at traumatic storytelling by members of Khulumani were not unique to this group. Complaints about the TRC and its storytelling practice were well established long before this support group was started (see Ross 2003: 32). The ideas that this kind of storytelling might be a culturally foreign and inflexible mode of individual healing or that storytelling might be a limited response to wider social, political and material needs were not particularly new either. During the first few months of my work with the Trauma Centre and the support group, I indeed encountered all of these criticisms. I quickly discovered another, unexpected aspect of storytelling, though, that introduced a new level of complexity. This new dimension was most clearly brought home to me during the first monthly meetings I attended. Trauma Centre staff involved with the group had warned me that Khulumani had recently been reviewing their standard practice of allowing researchers to sit in on monthly meetings and ask for interviews afterwards. I had long been aware of their ambivalence on this issue and was preparing myself to be asked to stop attending future meetings. Instead of discussing whether or not to allow researchers to attend, however, I soon discovered that the group had been discussing the going ‘market price’ for their stories, comparing notes on compensation with members of other groups who had recently worked with researchers and journalists. The discussion was apparently remarkably detailed and precise, with estimates for a standard one-and-a-half to two-hour recitation ranging from R100 to R150.2 Some complained that these figures were too low and recommended a minimum fee of R200. Maureen said that she would charge no less than R500 because she told a good story. Shirley said that most researchers were from rich countries and ‘R100 was not a lot of money… [we] should negotiate for the benefit of the group as a whole … [we] should not forget that we have bargaining power’. Many people in Trafficking trauma: Intellectual property rights and the political economy of traumatic storytelling 175 the meeting had had contact with researchers, or even worked as ‘lay’ researchers themselves. There were also debates around how to choose group members who would participate in research and how to divide the potential proceeds of these narrative exchanges. In the end, a provisional decision was taken to try and allocate research ‘opportunities’ equally and to divide any proceeds evenly between the individual and the group at large. Despite all of this planning, however, very little money changed hands in such a systematic fashion. Most researchers and journalists got away with paying nothing and those who did pay often conducted these transactions privately, with the standard price of a story ranging between R80 and R100. More often than not, however, when money did change hands, it went towards ‘expenses’ (transport and food) or ‘time’ rather than for the stories themselves. ¶ Despite the lack of systematic exchanges of money for stories, however, it soon became clear that each group member’s ‘story’ had not only been objectified – as a ‘thing’ that a member ‘had’ – but had come to function as a commodity as well. As I spent more time with the group and saw the many connections that these narrative transactions produced beyond the boundaries of the group, I began to imagine the work of storytelling as part of a larger network of relations of production and exchange. For Khulumani, the most visible participants in this system were the Trauma Centre, the TRC, local and foreign researchers and journalists and documentary filmmakers. Less obvious relations of exchange could have included the government agencies victims applied to for social services, other NGOs they came into contact with, international funding organisations, foreign governments, local beneficiaries, perpetrators and other victims. What I encountered, then, when I started working with Khulumani was a heavily storied and documented kind of victim–subject engaged in a process of narrative production and exchange with a range of interlocutors, near and far. In order to describe this phenomenon and look more broadly at the full range of its memorial demands and transactions, I developed a metaphor of the ‘global political economy of traumatic storytelling’. Tracing the circulation of narratives, the involvement of a multitude of actors and the creation of a range of new subjects, object, relationships and meanings, is also a way of opening a discussion about some of the broader effects of the global fascination with the traumatic memories of victims of human rights abuses. In this paper, I am particularly concerned with the consequences of Khulumani’s reluctant embrace of this political economy and its emerging sense that their stories of violation not only ‘belonged’ to them in an abstract way, but were a form of property as well. Wrestling for the means of production¶ One effect of this market for narratives of suffering is that traumatic storytelling has become the major way in which many victims negotiate relationships with Christopher J. Colvin 176 others. Their position in a field of relations between the international community, their national government, civil society, the media and the academy increasingly depends on their ability to produce and circulate engaging stories of suffering and recovery. In the process, victims’ stories become commodified objects that move out into the wider world and structure an entire network of subjects, objects, meanings and relationships. Some other effects include 1 the regulation of the narrative content and structure of stories wherein what sells and what does not become part of shaping the stories people tell 2 the shortening of stories into easily consumable packages that fit within the lines of a membership form, pension application, television interview or case history 3 the evolution of the idea that victims have a single story, ‘my story,’ a unitary, bounded and unchanging narrative that incorporates all that is essential in the ‘story of a victim’ 4 an anxiety over alienation from their story, once commodified.

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#### Obama’s strong -- leverage makes GOP obstructionism on immigration unsustainable

Jeff Mason, Reuters, 10/19/13, Analysis: Despite budget win, Obama has weak hand with Congress , health.yahoo.net/news/s/nm/analysis-despite-budget-win-obama-has-weak-hand-with-congress

Democrats believe, however, that Obama's bargaining hand may be strengthened by the thrashing Republicans took in opinion polls over their handling of the shutdown.

"This shutdown re-emphasized the overwhelming public demand for compromise and negotiation. And that may open up a window," said Ben LaBolt, Obama's 2012 campaign spokesman and a former White House aide.

"There's no doubt that some Republican members (of Congress) are going to oppose policies just because the president's for it. But the hand of those members was significantly weakened."

If he does have an upper hand, Obama is likely to apply it to immigration reform. The White House had hoped to have a bill concluded by the end of the summer. A Senate version passed with bipartisan support earlier this year but has languished in the Republican-controlled House.

"It will be hard to move anything forward, unless the Republicans find the political pain of obstructionism too much to bear," said Doug Hattaway, a Democratic strategist and an adviser to Hillary Clinton's 2008 presidential campaign.

"That may be the case with immigration - they'll face pressure from business and Latinos to advance immigration reform," he said.

#### The plan derails passage—2007 proves

Nakamura, 13. David Nakamura, staff writer for the Washington Post. “Dispute over guest-worker program puts immigration talks at risk of delay.” http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2013-03-28/politics/38089703\_1\_guest-worker-program-comprehensive-immigration-reform-barack-obama)

A worsening dispute over a new guest-worker program has emerged as the most serious obstacle to a bipartisan deal on immigration, threatening to delay the unveiling of a Senate bill early next month. The impasse has prompted a bitter round of name-calling between labor and business groups, which accuse each other of imperiling comprehensive immigration reform. The Obama administration has remained on the sidelines as the standoff has worsened, calculating that the president would risk alienating Republican senators crucial to the process. Obama said this week that the issue is “resolvable.” The guest-worker issue helped derail the last serious attempt at reform in 2007 with assistance from Obama, then a U.S. senator from Illinois. The current attempt at reform is being led by a bipartisan group of eight senators, who are attempting to fashion model legislation for a broad immigration overhaul. The dispute centers on rules governing the “future flow” of migrants who come to the United States for menial jobs. Republicans, citing business interests, want to give temporary work visas to up to 400,000 foreign workers a year at low wages. But unions and many Democrats, fearing the effect on U.S. workers, want fewer workers and higher pay under the program. Senators involved insist that they remain on schedule to complete a bill, including a path to citizenship for 11 million illegal immigrants, in early April. Obama also expressed confidence this week that the guest-worker disagreement could be solved. “I don’t agree that it’s threatening to doom the legislation,” Obama said in an interview Wednesday with Telemundo, the Spanish-language TV network. “Labor and businesses may not always agree exactly on how to do this, but this is a resolvable issue.” But behind the scenes, negotiations over the guest-worker program — and the White House’s refusal to take a position — have soured relations between the AFL-CIO and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, which a month ago joined hands to publicly proclaim agreement on an overall plan. “Unions say they want a guest-worker program, but their behavior is to the contrary,” said Geoff Burr, the Associated Builders and Contractors’ vice president for federal affairs. “They are insisting on a program that no employer would consider using.”

#### Obama’s capital key – Boehner

Bill Scher, The Week, 10/18/13, How to make John Boehner cave on immigration , theweek.com/article/index/251361/how-to-make-john-boehner-cave-on-immigration

Speaker John Boehner (R-Ohio) generally adheres to the unwritten Republican rule that bars him from allowing votes on bills opposed by a majority of Republicans, even if they would win a majority of the full House.

But he's caved four times this year, allowing big bills to pass with mainly Democratic support. They include repealing the Bush tax cuts for the wealthiest Americans; providing Hurricane Sandy relief; expanding the Violence Against Women act to better cover immigrants, Native Americans, and LGBT survivors of abuse; and this week's bill raising the debt limit and reopening the federal government.

Many presume the Republican House is a black hole sucking President Obama's second-term agenda into oblivion. But the list of Boehner's past retreats offers a glimmer of hope, especially to advocates of immigration reform. Though it has languished in the House, an immigration overhaul passed with bipartisan support in the Senate, and was given a fresh push by Obama in the aftermath of the debt limit deal.

The big mystery that immigration advocates need to figure out: What makes Boehner cave? Is there a common thread? Is there a sequence of buttons you can push that forces Boehner to relent?

Two of this year's caves happened when Boehner was backed up against hard deadlines: The Jan. 1 fiscal cliff and the Oct. 17 debt limit. Failure to concede meant immediate disaster. Reject the bipartisan compromise on rolling back the Bush tax cuts, get blamed for jacking up taxes on every taxpayer. Reject the Senate's three-month suspension of the debt limit, get blamed for sparking a global depression. Boehner held out until the absolute last minute both times, but he was not willing to risk blowing the deadline.

A third involved the response to an emergency: Hurricane Sandy. Conservative groups were determined to block disaster relief because — as with other federal disaster responses — the $51 billion legislative aid package did not include offsetting spending cuts. Lacking Republican votes, Boehner briefly withdrew the bill from consideration, unleashing fury from New York and New Jersey Republicans, including Gov. Chris Christie. While there wasn't a hard deadline to meet, disaster relief was a time-sensitive matter, and the pressure from Christie and his allies was unrelenting. Two weeks after pulling the bill, Boehner put it on the floor, allowing it to pass over the objections of 179 Republicans.

The fourth cave occurred in order to further reform and expand a government program: The Violence Against Women Act. The prior version of the law had been expired for over a year, as conservatives in the House resisted the Senate bill in the run-up to the 2012 election. But after Mitt Romney suffered an 18-point gender gap in his loss to Obama, and after the new Senate passed its version again with a strong bipartisan vote, Boehner was unwilling to resist any longer. Two weeks later, the House passed the Senate bill with 138 Republicans opposed.

Unfortunately for immigration advocates, there is no prospect of widespread pain if reform isn't passed. There is no immediate emergency, nor threat of economic collapse.

But there is a deadline of sorts: The 2014 midterm elections.

If we've learned anything about Boehner this month, it's that he's a party man to the bone. He dragged out the shutdown and debt limit drama for weeks, without gaining a single concession, simply so his most unruly and revolutionary-minded members would believe he fought the good fight and stay in the Republican family. What he won is party unity, at least for the time being.

What Boehner lost for his Republicans is national respectability. Republican Party approval hit a record low in both the most recent NBC/Wall Street Journal poll and Gallup poll.

Here's where immigration advocates have a window of opportunity to appeal to Boehner's party pragmatism. Their pitch: The best way to put this disaster behind them is for Republicans to score a big political victory. You need this.

A year after the Republican brand was so bloodied that the Republican National Committee had to commission a formal "autopsy," party approval is the worst it has ever been. You've wasted a year. Now is the time to do something that some voters will actually like.

There's reason to hope he could be swayed. In each of the four cases in which he allowed Democrats to carry the day, he put the short-term political needs of the Republican Party over the ideological demands of right-wing activists.

Boehner will have to do another round of kabuki. He can't simply swallow the Senate bill in a day. There will have to be a House version that falls short of activists' expectations, followed by tense House-Senate negotiations. Probably like in the most formulaic of movies, and like the fiscal cliff and debt limit deals, there will have to be an "all-is-lost moment" right before we get to the glorious ending. Boehner will need to given the room to do all this again.

But he won't do it without a push. A real good push.

#### Critical to US economic recovery

Aaron Terrazas, Migration Policy Institute, July 2011, The Economic Integration of Immigrants in the United States: Long- and Short-Term Perspectives, http://www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/EconomicIntegration.pdf

The fate of immigrants in the United States and their integration into the labor market are impossible to separate from the state of the overall US economy and the fate of all US workers. During periods of economic expansion and relative prosperity, upward economic mobility among the native born generates opportunities for immigrants to gain a foothold in the US labor market and to gradually improve their status over time. In many respects, a growing economy during the 1990s and early 2000s provided ample opportunity for immigrants — and especially their children — to gradually improve their status over time. However, the story of immigrants’ integration into the US labor force during the years leading to the recession was also mixed: In general, the foreign born had high labor force participation, but they were also more likely to occupy low-paying jobs. The most notable advances toward economic integration occur over generations, due in large part to the openness of US educational institutions to the children of immigrants and the historic lack of employment discrimination against workers with an immigrant background. In the wake of the global economic crisis, there is substantial uncertainty regarding the future trajectory of the US economy and labor market. Most forecasts suggest that the next decade will be substantially different from the past26 and it is not clear if previous trends in immigrants’ economic integration will continue. The recession, weak recovery, and prospect of prolonged stagnation as a result of continuing high public debt, could realign the economic and social forces that have historically propelled the the less-educated labor force have been dismal for decades. In some respects, the recession accelerated these trends. While the prospect of greater demand for US manufactured goods from emerging markets might slow gradual decay of the US manufacturing industry, the outlook for the industry remains weak. Steady educational gains throughout the developing world have simultaneously increased downward wage pressure on highly skilled workers who, in the past, generated substantial secondary demand for services that immigrants often provide.

#### **Nuclear war**

Harris and Burrows ‘9

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Of course, the report encompasses more than economics and indeed believes the future is likely to be the result of a number of intersecting and interlocking forces. With so many possible permutations of outcomes, each with ample Revisiting the Future opportunity for unintended consequences, there is a growing sense of insecurity. Even so, history may be more instructive than ever. While we continue to believe that the Great Depression is not likely to be repeated, the lessons to be drawn from that period include the harmful effects on fledgling democracies and multiethnic societies (think Central Europe in 1920s and 1930s) and on the sustainability of multilateral institutions (think League of Nations in the same period). There is no reason to think that this would not be true in the twenty-first as much as in the twentieth century. For that reason, the ways in which the potential for greater conflict could grow would seem to be even more apt in a constantly volatile economic environment as they would be if change would be steadier. In surveying those risks, the report stressed the likelihood that terrorism and nonproliferation will remain priorities even as resource issues move up on the international agenda. Terrorism’s appeal will decline if economic growth continues in the Middle East and youth unemployment is reduced. For those terrorist groups that remain active in 2025, however, the diffusion of technologies and scientific knowledge will place some of the world’s most dangerous capabilities within their reach. Terrorist groups in 2025 will likely be a combination of descendants of long established groups\_inheriting organizational structures, command and control processes, and training procedures necessary to conduct sophisticated attacks\_and newly emergent collections of the angry and disenfranchised that become self-radicalized, particularly in the absence of economic outlets that would become narrower in an economic downturn. The most dangerous casualty of any economically-induced drawdown of U.S. military presence would almost certainly be the Middle East. Although Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons is not inevitable, worries about a nuclear-armed Iran could lead states in the region to develop new security arrangements with external powers, acquire additional weapons, and consider pursuing their own nuclear ambitions. It is not clear that the type of stable deterrent relationship that existed between the great powers for most of the Cold War would emerge naturally in the Middle East with a nuclear Iran. Episodes of low intensity conflict and terrorism taking place under a nuclear umbrella could lead to an **unintended escalation** and broader conflict if clear red lines between those states involved are not well established. The close proximity of potential nuclear rivals combined with underdeveloped surveillance capabilities and mobile dual-capable Iranian missile systems also will produce inherent difficulties in achieving reliable indications and warning of an impending nuclear attack. The lack of strategic depth in neighboring states like Israel, short warning and missile flight times, and uncertainty of Iranian intentions may place more focus on preemption rather than defense, potentially leading to **escalating** **crises**. 36 Types of conflict that the world continues to experience, such as over resources, could reemerge, particularly if protectionism grows and there is a resort to neo-mercantilist practices. Perceptions of renewed energy scarcity will drive countries to take actions to assure their future access to energy supplies. In the worst case, this could result in interstate conflicts if government leaders deem assured access to energy resources, for example, to be essential for maintaining domestic stability and the survival of their regime. Even actions short of war, however, will have important geopolitical implications. Maritime security concerns are providing a rationale for naval buildups and modernization efforts, such as China’s and India’s development of blue water naval capabilities. If the fiscal stimulus focus for these countries indeed turns inward, one of the most obvious funding targets may be military. Buildup of regional naval capabilities could lead to increased tensions, rivalries, and counterbalancing moves, but it also will create opportunities for multinational cooperation in protecting critical sea lanes. With water also becoming scarcer in Asia and the Middle East, cooperation to manage changing water resources is likely to be increasingly difficult both within and between states in a more dog-eat-dog world.

## 1nc

#### We’ll defend the entirety of the 1AC without the plan text

#### Using the USFG is violent imperialism

Reid-Brinkley ‘8 (Dr. Shanara Reid-Brinkley, University of Pittsburgh Department of Communications, “THE HARSH REALITIES OF “ACTING BLACK”: HOW AFRICAN-AMERICAN POLICY DEBATERS NEGOTIATE REPRESENTATION THROUGH RACIAL PERFORMANCE AND STYLE” 2008)

So, within public discourse, how race is coded rhetorically in public deliberation is of critical import.

Mitchell observes that the stance of the policymaker in debate comes with a “sense of detachment associated with the spectator posture.”115 In other words, its participants are able to engage in debates where they are able to distance themselves from the events that are the subjects of debates. Debaters can throw around terms like torture, terrorism, genocide and nuclear war without blinking. Debate simulations can only serve to distance the debaters from real world participation in the political contexts they debate about. As William Shanahan remarks: …the topic established a relationship through interpellation that inhered irrespective of what the particular political affinities of the debaters were. The relationship was both political and ethical, and needed to be debated as such. When we blithely call for United States Federal Government policymaking, we are not immune to the colonialist legacy that establishes our place on this continent. We cannot wish away the horrific atrocities perpetrated everyday in our name simply by refusing to acknowledge these implications” (emphasis in original).116 118 The “objective” stance of the policymaker is an impersonal or imperialist persona. The policymaker relies upon “acceptable” forms of evidence, engaging in logical discussion, producing rational thoughts. As Shanahan, and the Louisville debaters’ note, such a stance is integrally linked to the normative, historical and contemporary practices of power that produce and maintain varying networks of oppression. In other words, the discursive practices of policy-oriented debate are developed within, through and from systems of power and privilege. Thus, these practices are critically implicated in the maintenance of hegemony. So, rather than seeing themselves as government or state actors, Jones and Green choose to perform themselves in debate, violating the more “objective” stance of the “policymaker” and require their opponents to do the same.

#### Vote negative to politicize the ballot AGAINST their useless style of simulated politics---we refuse to consent to a methodology that consolidates power in the hands of corporate oligarchy---Shattering the illusion of FIAT and forcing the aff to search for new Models of Debate---they don’t get a perm because we are asking a PRIOR QUESTION

Swyngedouw 8 (Erik, Prof of Social and Political Geography in School of Environment and Developpment at U of Manchester, Where is the political?)

The aim of this contribution is to re-centre political thought again by exploring the views of a series of political philosophers and interlocutors who share the view that ‘the political’ needs urgent attention, particularly in an environment that is sutured by a view of the ‘end of politics’ and the consolidation of a post-political and post-democratic condition. In the first part of the paper, I shall briefly consider the reduction, accelerating rapidly over the past few decades, of the political terrain to a post-democratic arrangement of oligarchic policing. The latter refers to the domination, to the attempted suturing of social space, by an instituted police order in which expert administration (a science/technology-management-policy assemblage), the naturalisation of the political to the management of a presumably inevitable ordering, and the desire for ‘good governance’ by an administrative elite in tandem with an economic oligarchy has occupied and increasingly tries to fill out, to suture, the spatiality of the political. In other words, the space of the political is increasingly colonised and saturated by the spaces of policies. In a second part, I shall attempt to re-centre the political by drawing on the work of a range of political theorists and philosophers who have begun to question this post- political order. Despite significant differences among them, they share a series of common understandings about what constitutes the domain of the political. The theme of the final section will be to consider the contours for reclaiming political democracy. I shall argue that democracy and democratic politics, and the spaces for democratic engagement need to be taken back from the post-political oligarchic constituent police order that has occupied and filled out the spaces of instituted democracy. It is in these political spaces that utopias as concrete political interventions germinate. The sort of utopia that Žižek argues is urgently needed today: “[t]he true utopia is when the situation is so without issue, without a way to resolve it within the coordinates of the possible that out of the pure urge of survival you have to invent a new space. Utopia is not kind of a free imagination; utopia is a matter of innermost urgency. You are forced to imagine it as the only way out, and this is what we need today” (Žižek 2005).

The Post-Political and Post-Democratic Condition “There is a shift form the model of the polis founded on a centre, that is, a public centre or agora, to a new metropolitan spatialisation that is certainly invested in a process of de-politicisation, which results in a strange zone where it is impossible to decide what is private and what is public” (Agamben 2006). Pierre Rosanvallon, in his search for a renewed political democracy, laments the recent obsession with (good) ‘governance’ as the new name of a government that would be sufficient for everyone, that would encompass, suture, the social order. For him, this replaces “politics by widely disseminated techniques of management, leaving room for one sole actor on the scene: international society, uniting under the same banner the champions of the market and the prophets of law” (Rosanvallon 2006: 228). These arrangements of ‘good’ governance relate to those who embrace “the development of a new type of civil society that would finally substitute for the world of politics. On this front one finds the naïve representatives of NGOs – leftists who have re-invented themselves as humanitarians – and the executives of multinational corporations, all of whom commune together today in a touching defense of an international civil society. The utopias of the one, alas, are hardly different from the hypocrisies of the others” (Rosanvallon 2006: 228). Slavoj Žižek defines such ‘governance’ as post-political arrangements that focus on the administration (policing) of environmental, social, economic or other domains: “The ultimate sign of post-politics in all Western countries”, he argues, “is the growth of a managerial approach to government: government is reconceived as a managerial function, deprived of its proper political dimension” (Žižek 2002a: 303). This post-political frame reduces politics to the sphere of governing and polic(y)ing through allegedly participatory deliberative procedures, with a given distribution of places and functions, one that excludes those who are deemed ‘irresponsible’ (see (Raco 2003);(Baeten 2008);(Swyngedouw 2008a)). It is policy- making set within a given distribution of what is possible and driven by a desire for consent within a context of recognized difference. The stakeholders (i.e. those with recognized speech) are known in advance and disruption or dissent is reduced to the instituted and institutional modalities of governing, the technologies of expert administration and management, to the dispositifs (see (Agamben 2007)) of ‘good governance’: “In post-politics, the conflict of global ideological visions embodied in different parties which compete for power is replaced by the collaboration of enlightened technocrats (economists, public opinion specialists …) and liberal multiculturalists; via the process of negotiation of interests, a compromise is reached in the guise of a more or less universal consensus. Post-politics thus emphasizes the need to leave old ideological visions behind and confront new issues, armed with the necessary expert knowledge and free deliberation that takes people’s concrete needs and demands into account.” (Žižek 1999b: 198) “The political (the space of litigation in which the excluded can protest the wrong/injustice done to them), [is] foreclosed … It is crucial to perceive … the post-political suspension of the political in the reduction of the state to a mere police agent servicing the (consensually established) needs of the market forces and multiculturalist tolerant humanitarianism” (Zizek, 2006: 72).

This post-political condition takes the scandalous proposition of Marx that the state is the executive branch of the capitalist class as literally true: identifying politics with the management of capitalism is no longer a hidden secret behind the appearance of formal democracy; it has become the openly declared basis for democratic legitimacy. Maximizing the enjoyment of the people can only be achieved by declaring the inability or incapacity of the people (as a political name) to arrange or manage themselves the conditions of this maximization. The power of post-political democracy resides, in other words, in the declaration of its impotence to act politically (Rancière 1998: 113). Moreover, any denunciation or any struggle against this tactic of depoliticisation is regarded as going against historical necessity. Once again drawing on a populist and perverted Marxism, those protesting are deemed to go against the grain of history and belong to an outdated social group embracing transcended ideologies. The irony is indeed how depoliticisation is effectuated by a certain return to Marx (Rancière 2005b: 95). The post-political in its instituted democratic form, of course, elevates the ‘scandal of democracy’ to new heights. This ‘scandal’ refers to the democratic promise of the identity of the state with the people, a promise that must, of necessity, annul the constitutive antagonisms that cut through ‘the people’. While the place of power in democracy is structurally vacant (as it is liberated from the god-given location on which pre-modern state power was legitimized – (see (Lefort 1994)), yet is metaphorically filled with ‘the people’ as sovereign, those who occupy the place of power and democracy must suture the social order, contain the inherent antagonisms of the social order by suturing social space; the totality of the social is presented in the body of the state. This impossibility, the rupture of the democratic condition from within, is exactly where Claude Lefort (but see also Hannah Arendt from a slightly different perspective (Ahrendt 1973)) locates the totalitarian kernel of democratic forms (Lefort 1986). Democracy’s dark underbelly resides exactly in how its identification with the people can drive towards a position where the occupation of the place of power identifies with the whole of the people, disavows the constitutive conflicts within the social order and the gap between the place of political and the social ordering of the people. Post-politics is caught in this tension: the disappearance of the political as the space for the enunciation of dissensus (see below) and the suturing of social space by the post-political order harbours authoritarian gestures (see (Swyngedouw 2000), exactly by foreclosing the possibility for the political to emerge.

In sum, post-politics is of necessity a violation of democracy. It requires foreclosing or displacing dissent and manufacturing consent and, therefore, annuls the proper democratic political. Indeed, the tension between the Multiple of the Political and the Singular or the One of Policy (Swyngedouw 2008b) is overlaid by the ‘scandal of democracy’, its impossible core that promises pluralist dissensual arrangements, yet institutes exclusive, singular, consensual practices. Indeed, post-politics refuses politicisation which aims at “more” than the negotiation of interests. A consensual post- politics arises that either eliminates fundamental conflict (usually by invoking the whole of the people – (see (Swyngedouw 2007a) and/or elevates it to Schmittian antithetical ultra-politics (Schmitt 1996). The consensual times we are currently living in have thus eliminated a genuine political space of disagreement.

Propelled on by a drive towards reflexivity, the need to make decisions on processes with high risk low probability (Beck’s risk society thesis) on the one hand and the injunction to choose in the absence of any grounding or guarantee in truth, transfers administrative powers increasingly to a technocratic-scientific elite who is supposed to know and (cap)able to manage the situation. While difficulties and problems are staged and generally accepted as problematic (such as, for example, climate change, social exclusion, economic competitiveness, and the like), they need to be dealt with through compromise, managerial and technical arrangement, and the production of consensus. Consensus, in a very precise sense, is for Rancière the key condition of post-politics: “Consensus refers to that which is censored … Consensus means that whatever your personal commitments, interests and values may be, you perceive the same things, you give them the same name. But there is no contest on what appears, on what is given in a situation and as a situation. Consensus means that the only point of contest lies on what has to be done as a response to a given situation. Correspondingly, dissensus and disagreement don’t only mean conflict of interests, ideas and so on. They mean that there is a debate on the sensible givens of a situation, a debate on that which you see and feel, on how it can be told and discussed, who is able to name it and argue about it … It is about the visibilities of the places and abilities of the body in those places, about the partition of private and public spaces, about the very configuration of the visible and the relation of the visible to what can be said about it … Consensus is the dismissal of politics as a polemical configuration of the common world” (Rancière 2003b: §4- 6).

Consensus, as the “the annulment of dissensus” announces the “end of politics” (Rancière 2001: §32). This post-political world eludes choice and freedom (other than those tolerated by the consensus). However, consensus does not equal peace or absence of fundamental conflict (Rancière 2005a: 8). Indeed, in the absence of real politicization, the only position of real dissent is that of either the traditionalist or the fundamentalist. The only way to deal with them is by sheer violence, by suspending their ‘humanitarian’ and ‘democratic’ rights. The post-political relies on either including all in a consensual pluralist order and on excluding radically those who posit themselves outside the consensus. For the latter, as Agamben (Agamben 2005) argues, the law is suspended; they are literally put outside the law and treated as extremists and terrorists: those who are not with us are irremediably against us, they constitute the enemy. Invoking the Whole/the One of the people, while denying the constitutive antagonisms and splits within the people and that cut through the social order, post-political governance is necessarily exclusive, partial, and predicated upon outlawing those that do not subscribe to the consensual arrangement. That is exactly why for Agamben ‘the Camp’ has become the core figure to identify the condition of our time. In other words, a Schmittian ultra- politics that lurks behind and underneath the post-political consensual order and does not tolerate an outside, that sutures the entire social space by the tyranny of the police (state) and squeezes out the political, pits those who ‘participate’ in the instituted configurations of the consensual post-political order radically against those who are placed outside, like the sans-papiers, political islam, radical environmentalists, communists and alter- globalists, or the otherwise marginalized. The riots in the suburbs of France’s big cities in the fall of 2005 and the police responses to this event were classic violent examples of such urban ultra-politics (see Dikec, 2007). This post-political consensus, therefore, is radically reactionary as it forestalls the articulation of divergent, conflicting, and alternative trajectories of future socio-environmental and socio-spatial possibilities and assemblages. There is no contestation over the givens of the situation, over the partition of the sensible, there is only debate over the technologies of management, the arrangements of policing, the configuration of those who already have a stake, whose voice is already recognized as legitimate. Consider, for example, how current climate change policy aims to retro-fit the climate with technological-managerial interventions in order to continue as before, in order to make sure nothing changes fundamentally (see (Swyngedouw 2007a), so that things go on as before! (Dean 2006).

Rancière, Mouffe and Crouch associate the political ‘form’ of this post-political consensus with the emergence of post-democatic institutional configurations: “Postdemocracy is the government practice and conceptual legitimation of a democracy after the demos, a democracy that has eliminated the appearance, miscount, and dispute of the people and is thereby reducible to the sole interplay of state mechanisms and combinations of social energies and interests … Consensus demoracy is a reasonable agreement between individuals and social groups who have understood that knowing what is possible and negotiating between partners are a way for each party to obtain the optimal share that the objective givens of the situation allow them to hope for and which is preferable to conflict. But for parties to opt for discussion rather than a fight, they must exist as parties who then have to choose between two ways of obrtaining their share …. What consensus thus presupposes is the disappearance of any gap between a party to a dispute and a part of society …. It is, in a word, the disappearance of politics” (Rancière 1998: 102) (see also (Mouffe 2005: 29).

This arrangement assumes that “all parties are known and a world in which everything is on show, in which parties are counted with none left over and in which everything can be solved by objectifying problems” (Rancière 1998: 102). There is no excess left over and above that what is instituted. There is indeed a close relationship between the post- political condition and the functioning of the political system. Colin Crouch, Chantalle Mouffe and others insist that this kind of consensual post-politics is paralleled by the rise of a post-democratic institutional configuration ((Crouch 2000, 2004). For Colin Crouch, there is a significant decline of government by the people and for the people. Although the formal configuration of democracy is still intact, there is a proliferating arsenal of new processes that bypass, evacuate or articulate with these formal institutions. I have elsewhere defined constituted post-democracy as embodying new forms of autocratic Governance-Beyond-the-State (Swyngedouw 2005) in which the act of governing is reconfigured on the basis of a stakeholder arrangement of governance in which the traditional state forms (national, regional, or local government) partakes together with experts, NGOs, and other ‘responsible’ partners (see Crouch, 2004) in partitioning the sensible, in organizing the ‘distribution of places and functions’. This is the condition of post-1991 democracy. Not only is the political arena evacuated from radical dissent, critique, and fundamental conflict, but the parameters of democratic governing itself are being shifted, announcing new forms of governmentality, in which traditional disciplinary society is transfigured into a society of control through disembedded networks of governance. These new glocal forms of ‘governance’, operative at a range of articulated spatial scales, are expressive of the post-political configuration (Mouffe 2005: 103) (Swyngedouw 2007b) (Swyngedouw 2008a).

These arrangements of ‘governance-beyond-the-state’ are resolutely put forward as an idealized normative model (see (Le Galès 2002) (Schmitter 2002) that promise to fulfill the conditions of good government “in which the boundary between organisations and public and private sectors has become permeable” (Stoker 1998: 38). They are constituted as presumably horizontally networked associations, and based on interactive relations between independent and interdependent actors that share a high degree of consensus and trust, despite internal conflict and oppositional agendas, within selectively inclusive participatory institutional or organisational settings. They imply a common purpose, joint action, a framework of shared values, continuous interaction and the wish to achieve collective benefits that cannot be gained by acting independently (Stoker 1998) (Rakodi 2003). It is predicated upon a consensual agreement on the existing conditions (the state of the situation) and the main objectives to be achieved. They exhibit an institutional configuration based on the inclusion of private market actors, civil society groups, and parts of the ‘traditional’ state apparatus (Lemke 2002) in which a particular rationality of governing is combined with new technologies, instruments, and tactics of conducting the process of collective rule-setting, implementation, and often including policing as well.. The mobilised technologies of governance revolve around individualisation, reflexive risk-calculation (self-assessment), accountancy rules and accountancy based disciplining, quantification and bench-marking of performance. As Lemke (2002: 50) argues, such arrangements announce “a transformation of politics that restructures the power relations in society. What we observe today is not a diminishment or reduction of state sovereignty and planning capacities, but a displacement from formal to informal techniques of government and the appearance of new actors on the scene of government (e.g. NGOs), that indicate fundamental transformations in statehood and a renewed relation between state and civil society actors”.

Politics is hereby reduced to the sphere of policy-making, to the domain of governing and polic(y)ing through allegedly (and often imposed) participatory deliberative procedures, with a given distribution of places and functions. Consensual policy-making in which the stakeholders (i.e. those with recognized speech) are known in advance and where disruption or dissent is reduced to debates over the institutional modalities of governing and the technologies of expert administration or management, announces the end of politics, annuls dissent from the consultative spaces of policy making and evacuates the proper political from the public sphere. In this post-democratic post-political constitution, adversarial politics (of the left/right variety or of radically divergent struggles over imagining and naming different socio-environmental futures for example) are considered hopelessly out of date. Although disagreement and debate are of course still possible, they operate within an overall model of elite consensus and agreement (Crouch 2004), subordinated to a managerial-technocratic regime (see also (Jörke 2005) (Blühdorn 2006)), sustained by a series of populist tactics. What is at stake then, is the practice of genuine democracy, of a return to the polis, the public space for the encounter and negotiation of disagreement, where those who have no place, are not counted or named, can acquire, or better still, appropriate voice, become part of the police. But before we can consider this, we need to return to the possibilities of ‘thinking the political’.

Thinking the political I situate my argument of what constitutes the political in the interstices between two great, but radically opposed, perspectives that have galvanised much of progressive and leftist energies over the past few years. The first one is Hardt and Negri’s Empire and the immanent force of the multitude whose energies are liberated through the vicissitudes of empire, which in its womb, already harbours and nurtures the free reign of the multitude that will transgress and revolutionise the very disempowering and unequally constituted constellation of Empire (Hardt and Negri 2001). Indeed, as they could claim at the end of their book, there is an unbearable lightness in being communist as the immanent force of the multitude will realise itself through some sort of mythical energetic force. The multitude as political agent, from their perspective, grows out of and supplants Empire as a necessary, teleological, revolutionary gesture; political subjectivity is barred, annulled; the forces of empire will just do the trick. In this sense, the observation that Hardt and Negri have written the Communist Manifesto for the 21st Century is correct; it breathes the same unrelenting belief in the immanence of the multitude as it will emerge from the debris of a transcended imperial order, and a politics of egalibertarian emancipation is already structurally fermenting within the interstices of rhizomatic and decentred imperial reign. Second, and at the other side of the spectre stands, symbolically speaking, John Holloway’s Change the world without taking power (Holloway 2002). For him, radical transformation resides in continuous political activism, the obsessive desire for becoming that supplants the need for being, for spatialisation. His emancipatory politics adheres to the sort of activism that asks the constituent oligarchic polity of state and of economy to change, to take the demands seriously. It is political acting that aims at changing the elites not at their transformation, let alone their replacement in a different constituent order. While the political is an immanent process borne out of the configurations of empire for Negri, it is the obsessive activist, driven by a desire for justice and an analytical toolkit that situates injustices within the contours of the politico-economic and socio-cultural order that holds the promise for radical change for Holloway. Simon Critchley offers an ethico-philosophical foundation for such anarchic ‘politics of resistance’ (Critchley 2007). For Slavoj Žižek, such politics of resistance has de facto accepted the inevitability of capitalism’s global hegemony and retreats in the bulwark of localised political activism, centred on a critique of what is and acts around the provision of a space for the multitude of new subjectivities. In a review of this position, Zizek (Žižek 2007) states: “The big demonstrations in London and Washington against the US attack on Iraq a few years ago offer an exemplary case of this strange symbiotic relationship between power and resistance. Their paradoxical outcome was that both sides were satisfied. The protesters saved their beautiful souls: they made it clear that they don’t agree with the government’s policy on Iraq. Those in power calmly accepted it, even profited from it: not only did the protests in no way prevent the already-made decision to attack Iraq; they also served to legitimise it. Thus George Bush’s reaction to mass demonstrations protesting his visit to London, in effect: ‘You see, this is what we are fighting for, so that what people are doing here – protesting against their government policy – will be possible also in Iraq!’”

In what follows, I shall propose and explore a different foundation of and for the political, one that foregrounds the notion of equality as the foundation for democracy, for égaliberté as an unconditional democratic demand, one that sees the properly political as a procedure that disrupts any given socio-spatial order, one that addresses a ‘wrong’. This ‘wrong’ is a condition in which the axiomatic principle of equality is perverted through the institution of an order that is always necessarily oligarchic. The proper political, therefore, always operates at a certain distance from the state, but is aimed at the transformation of the state (the police). Let me start with considering Jacques Rancière’s conceptualization of politics and the political. For him, the space of the political has become sutured by what he defines as the police (or policy) (Rancière 1998);(Rancière 1995). He explores whether the political can still be thought in an environment in which a post-political consensual policy arrangement has increasingly reduced the ‘political’ to ‘policing’, to ‘policy-making’, to managerial consensual governing. Rancière distinguishes between ‘the police’ (la police), ‘the political’ (le politique), and ‘politics’ (la politique) (see also (Ricoeur 1965); (Lefort 2000)). The ‘police’ is defined as the existing order of things and constitutes a certain ‘partition of the sensible’ (Rancière 2001: 8): the police refers to “all the activities which create order by distributing places, names, functions” (Rancière 1994: 173). This partition of the sensible “renders visible who can be part of the common in function of what he does, of the times and the space in which this activity is exercised … This defines the fact of being visible or not in a common space … It is a partitioning of times and spaces, of the visible and the invisible, of voice and noise that defines both the place (location) and the arena of the political as a form of experience” (Rancière 2000a: 13-14). The police refers to both the activities of the state as well as to the ordering of social relations and “… sees that those bodies are assigned by name to a particular place and task; it is an order of the visible and the sayable that sees that a particular activity is visible and another is not, that this speech is understood as discourse and another as noise” (Rancière 1998: 29). Indeed, as Dikec maintains, the police “relies on a symbolically constituted organization of social space, an organization that becomes the basis of and for governance. Thus, the essence of policing is not repression but distribution – distribution of places, peoples, names, functions, authorities, activities and so on – and the normalization of this distribution” (Dikeç 2007: chapter 2, p. 5). It is a rule governing the appearance of bodies, that configures a set of activities and occupations and arranges the characteristics of the spaces where these activities are organized or distributed (Rancière 1998: 29). The police order is predicated upon saturation, upon suturing social space: “[t]he essence of the police is the principle of saturation; it is a mode of the partition of the sensible that recognizes neither lack nor supplement. As conceived by ‘the police’, society is a totality compromised of groups performing specific functions and occupying determined spaces” (Rancière 2000c: 124). This drive to suturing is of course never realized. The constitutive antagonisms that rupture society preempt saturation; there will always be a constituted lack or surplus, that what is not accounted for in the symbolic order of the police (Dikeç 2005). It is exactly this lack or excess (the ‘void’ for (Badiou 2006)) that constitutes the possibility of the political.

The political, then, is about enunciating dissent and rupture, literally voicing speech that claims a place in the order of things, demanding “the part for those who have no-part” (Rancière 2001: 6). The political is the arena in which Ochlos is turned into Demos, where the anarchic noise of the rabble (the part that has no-part) is turned into the recognized voice of the people, the spaces where that what is only registered as noise by the police is turned into voice. In the Nights of Labor, Rancière explores how the workers in 19th century France, through carving out there times and spaces, became the political subject under the name of the proletarian and, through this, claimed their place in the police order (Rancière 1989). Politics is, therefore, always disruptive, it emerges with the “refusal to observe the ‘place’ allocated to people and things (or at least, to particular people and things)” (Robson 2005: 5): it is the terrain where the axiomatic principle of equality is tested in the face of a wrong experienced by ‘those who have no part’; a ‘wrong’ that is always inherent in the oligarchic spaces of an instituted democratic polity. In other words, equality is the very premise upon which a democratic politics is constituted; the foundational gesture of democracy is equality. It opens up the space of the political through the testing of a wrong that subverts equality, a subversion that inheres in the constituted ‘forms’ of democracy and, in an intensified way, in its post- political guise. Rancière is here on the same terrain as Alain Badiou: “[E]quality is not something to be researched or verified but a principle to be upheld” (Hallward 2003a: 228). Emancipatory politics emerge out of a fidelity to the democratic principle of equality; it is the unconditional given of and for democracy. Equality is, consequently, not some sort of utopian longing, but the very condition upon which the democratic political is founded. The truth (in the sense of being true or faithful to something) of democracy is its universalising foundation on equality and the demand for justice, for a just politics. Etienne Balibar (Balibar 1993) names this fusion of equality and liberty ‘égaliberté’, the former defined as the absence of discrimination and the latter as absence of repression (Dikeç 2001). The very promise of democracy, but which is always scandalously perverted, and therefore necessitates its continuing reclamation, is founded on the universalising and collective process of emancipation as égaliberté. Indeed, freedom and equality can only be conquered: they are never offered, granted or distributed.

The political, therefore, is not about expressing demands to the elites to rectify inequalities or unfreedoms, exemplified by the demands of many activists and others who are choreographing resistance to the police order, but, in contrast, it is the demand to be counted, named, and recognized as part of the police order. It is the articulation of voice that demands its place in the spaces of the police order: it appears, for example, when undocumented workers shout “we are here, therefore we are from here” and demand their place within the socio-political edifice. These are the evental time-spaces from where a proper political sequence may unfold. The political is about the unconditional enunciation of the right to égaliberté, the right to the polis; the political is thus premised on the unconditionality of equality in an oligarchic police arrangement that has always already ‘wronged’ the very condition of equality and liberty. This is of course what Rancière also refers as the scandal of democracy that maintains a singular presence, yet is radically split into two processes: the oligarchic police process on the one hand and the principle of equality expressed through the process of emanciptation on the other (Rancière 1998). Democratic politics, therefore, are radically anti-utopian; they are not about fighting for a utopian future, but are precisely about bringing into being, spatialising, what is already promised by the very principle upon which the democratic political is constituted, i.e. equality.

If the supervision of places and functions is defined as the ‘police’, “a proper political sequence begins, then, when this supervision is interrupted so as to allow a properly anarchic disruption of function and place, a sweeping de-classification of speech. The democratic voice is the voice of those who reject the prevailing social distribution of roles, who refuse the way a society shares out power and authority”. (Hallward 2003b: 192). The proper political act, Rancière maintains, is the voice of “floating subjects that deregulate all respresentations of places and portions.”(Rancière 1998: 99-100): “In the end everything in politics turns on the distribution of spaces. What are these places? How do they function? Why are they there? Who can occupy them? For me, political action always acts upon the social as the litigious distribution of places and roles. It is always a matter of knowing who is qualified to say what a particular place is and what is done to it.” (Rancière 2003a: 201)

The political arises when the given order of things is questioned; when those whose voice is only recognized as noise by the policy order claim their right to speak, acquire speech, and produce the spatiality that permits and sustains this right. As such, it disrupts the order of being, exposes the constituent antagonisms, voids and excesses that constitute the police order, and tests the principle of equality. The political, therefore, always operates from a certain minimal distance from the State/the police1. Politics proper, then, is the confrontation of the political with the police order, when the principle of equality confronts a wrong instituted through the police order. It appears thus when the police order is dislocated, transgressed, “when the natural order of domination is interrupted by the institution of a part of those who have no part” (Rancière 1998: 11): “[p]olitics in general … is about the visibilities of places and abilities of the body in these places, about the partition of public and private spaces, about the very configuration of the visible and the relation of the visible to what can be said about it. All this is what I call the partition of the sensible” (Rancière 2003b: 3). A proper democratic political sequence, therefore, is not one that seeks justice and equality through governmental procedures on the basis of sociologically defined injustices or inequalities, but rather starts from the paradigmatic condition of equality or égaliberté, one that is ‘wronged’ by the police order. Therefore, a proper politics is one that asserts the principle of equality and justice as its original principle, not as a normative goal; democratic politics is, therefore, always disruptive and transformative:

“Political activity is whatever shifts a body from the place assigned to it or changes a place’s destination. It makes visible what had no business being seen, and makes heard a discourse where once there was only place for noise; it makes understood as discourse what was once only heard as noise” (Rancière 1998: 30). Politics acts on the police (Rancière 1998: 33) and “… revolves around what is seen and what can be said about it, around who has the ability to see and the talent to speak, around the properties of spaces and the possibilities of time” (Rancière 2006b: 13).

The space of the political is to “disturb this arrangement [the police] by supplementing it with a part of the no-part identified with the community as a whole” (Rancière 2001), it is a particular that stands for the whole of the community and aspires towards universalisation. The space of the political is therefore always specific, concrete, particular, but stands as the metaphorical condensation of the universal. And of course, politics is about the production of spaces and the recognition of the principle of dissensus as the proper base for politics. As Rancière attests: “[t]he principle function of politics is the configuration of its proper space. It is to disclose the world of its subjects and its operations. The essence of politics is the manifestation of dissensus, as the presence of two worlds in on” (Rancière 2001: Thesis 8); it occurs when there is a place and a way for the meeting of the police process with the process of equality (Rancière 1998: 30). Politics has, therefore, no foundational place or location: “Politics ‘takes place’ in the space of the police, by rephrasing and restaging social issues, police problems and so on”, it is the disruption of the police order (Rancière 2003c: 7). It can arise anywhere and everywhere. “[S]pace becomes political in that it … becomes an integral element of the interruption of the ‘natural’ (or, better yet, naturalized) order of domination through the constitution of a place of encounter by those that have no part in that order. The political, in this account, is signaled by this encounter as a moment of interruption, and not by the mere presence of power relations and competing interests” (Dikeç 2005: 172). The political understood in above terms rejects a naturalization of the political, signals that a political ‘passage à l’acte’ does not rely on expert knowledge and administration (the partition of the sensible), but on a disruption of the field of vision and of the distribution of functions and spaces on the basis of the principle of equality. With Alain Badiou, Rancière shares the view that the political event is rare and unusual; they are far from believing that ‘everything is political’, the clarion call of 1970s style progressive movements. While the political event might arise anywhere and everywhere, the political sequence is unusual, eventual, not predictable, and, above all, disruptive. Politics, i.e. the struggle of those who have no name and no voice to enter the space of the police, the contested borderline zone between the political and the police, is an even rarer moment, when those who are part of the situation but not part of the state of the situation become part of the state.

This view of the political as a space of dissensus, for enunciating difference and for negotiating conflict, stands in sharp contrast to the consolidating consensual ‘post- politics’ of contemporary neo-liberal ‘good’ governance. Of course, it also begs the question as to what to do. How to reclaim the political, as discussed above, from the debris of consensual autocratic post-political post-democracy? Claiming the Democratic Polis

The notion of the political articulated in this paper centers on division, conflict, and polemic (Valentine 2005), accepts the constitutive antagonisms that split ‘the people’, that traverse the myth of the One, the singular, and rejects the myth of an archae-political possibility of an organic, sutured, unfractured community, the possibility of a community one with itself. Therefore, democracy always operates against pacification, acknowledges social disruption, and disturbs the management of consensus and ‘stability’. As Peter Hallward, echoing Rancière and Badiou, argues: “[t]he concern of democracy is not with the formulation of agreement or the preservation of order but with the invention of new and hitherto unauthorised modes of disaggregation, disagreement and disorder” (Hallward 2005: 34-35). A political truth procedure, for Badiou, is initiated when in the name of equality fidelity to an event is declared, a fidelity that, although always particular, aspires to become public, to universalize. It is a wager on the truth of the egalitarian political sequence, unleashed by a declaration of fidelity to the communist hypothesis (Badiou 2008), a truth that can be only verified ex-post. Preferred examples of Badiou and Žižek are Robespierre, Lenin, or Mao in their declaration of fidelity to the procedure of communist truth in the revolutionary event.

Badiou defines ‘le passage à l’acte’ as an intervention in the state of the situation that transforms and transgresses the symbolic orders of the existing condition and marks a shift from the old to a new situation, one that cannot any longer be thought of in terms of the old symbolic framings. Žižek insists that such a political act does not start ‘from the art of the possible, but from the art of the impossible’ (Žižek 1999b). Proper politics is thus about enunciating demands that lie beyond the symbolic order of the police; demands that cannot be symbolized within the frame of reference of the police and, therefore, would necessitate a transformation in and of the police to permit symbolization to occur. Yet, these are demands that are eminently sensible and feasible when the frame of the symbolic order is shifted, when the parallax gap between what is (the constituted symbolic order of the police) and what can be (the reconstituted symbolic order made possible through a shift in vantage points, one that starts from the partisan universalizing principle of equality). This is the actual political process through which those that have no part claim their place within the symbolic edifice of the police, become part of the state of the situation. This is where the impossible egalitarian demands are formulated and fought for that express and transgress the partition of the sensible, that require a transformation of socio-physical space and the institution of a radically different partition of the sensible. It is the sort of demands that ‘restructure the entire social space’ (Žižek 1999b: 208), that are impossible to be symbolized within the existing police order. The form of politicization predicated upon universalizing egalibertarian demands cuts directly against the radical politics that characterize so much of the current forms and theorizations of resistance. Rather than embracing the multitude of singularities and the plurality of possible modes of becoming, this approach starts from the suturing attempts of the existing police order and its associated social relations; rather than reveling in the immanence of imperial transformation, an immanence to which there is no outside (à la Hardt and Negri), rather than the micropolitics of dispersed resistances, alternative practices, and affects (à la Holloway or Critchley), the view explored in this contribution foregrounds division and exclusion and emphases the ‘passage to the act’ through a political truth procedure that necessitates taking sides (see (Dean 2006: 115). Politics understood as rituals of resistance is, according to Zizek, doomed to fail politically: “Radical political practices itself is conceived as an unending process which can destabilize, displace, and so on, the power structure, without ever being able to undermine it effectively – the ultimate goal of radical politics is ultimately to displace the limit of social exclusions, empowering the excluded agents (sexual and ethnic minorities) by creating marginal spaces in which they can articulate and question their identity” (Žižek 2002b: 101).

The problem with such tactics is not only that they leave the symbolic order intact and at best ‘tickle’ the police order, they are actually conducive to the flows of global capital and can be fully subsumed within it. As Žižek puts it, “these practices of performative reconfiguration/displacement ultimately support what they intend to subvert, since the very field of such ‘transgressions’ are already taken into account, even engendered by the hegemomic form” (Žižek 1999b: 264).

In contrast, as Alain Badiou (Badiou 2005b) argues, a new radical politics requires formulating and enrolling new great fictions that create real possibilities for constructing different egalibertarian socio-environmental or geographical futures. This requires foregrounding and naming different socio-environmental futures, making the new and impossible enter the realm of politics and of democracy on the basis of the very promise of democracy (egaliberty), but which the oligarchic hatred of democracy systematically undermines or disrupts, and recognizing conflict, difference, and struggle over the naming and trajectories of these futures. Politics consists in a “series of actions that reconfigure the space where parties, parts, or lack of any parts have been defined (Rancière 1998: 30)” cited in (Dikeç 2005: 181-182)”. Proper egalitarian democracy is “the symbolic institution of the political in the form of the power of those who are not entitled to exercise power – a rupture in the order of legitimacy and domination. It is the paradoxical power of those who do not count: the count of the ‘unaccounted for’” (Rancière 2000c: 124). Dissensus is the proper name of egalitarian politics:

“The notion of dissensus thus means the following: politics is comprised of a surplus of subjects that introduce, within the saturated order of the police, a surplus of objects. These subjects do not have the consistency of coherent social groups united by a common property or a common birth, etc. They exist entirely within the act, and their actions are manifestations of a dissensus; that is, the making contentious of the givens of a particular situation. The subjects of politics make visible that which is not perceivable, that which, under the optics of a given perceptive field, did not possess a raison d’être, that which did not have a name …. This … constitutes the ground for political action: certain subjects that do not count create a common polemical scene where they put into contention the objective status of what is ‘given’ and impose an examination and discussion of those things that were not ‘visible’, that were not accounted for previously” (Rancière 2000c: 124-125)

Therefore, the political act (intervention) proper is “not simply something that works well within the framework of existing relations, but something that changes the very framework that determines how things work …. it changes the very parameters of what is considered ‘possible’ in the existing constellation (emphasis in original)” (Žižek 1999b: 199). The political becomes for Žižek and Rancière the space of litigation (Žižek 1998), the space for those who are not-All, who are uncounted and unnamed, not part of the ‘police’ (symbolic or state) order. A true political space is always a space of contestation for those who have no name or no place.

This is where the impossible egalitarian demands are formulated and fought for that express and transgress the partition of the sensible, demands that presupposes or requires a transformation of socio-physical space. Such egalitarian-democratic demands, scandalous in the representation order of the police yet eminently realizable, are like those formulated in the last chapter of the Communist Manifesto (universal and free education, universal and free care for the elderly, universal and equitable voting rights, universal and free health care, collective organization of (produced) natures). When these demands were formulated in 1848, they were scandalous, deeply disruptive and rejected out of hand as impossible by the police order. Yet, four of these five demands were realized in one form or another in most of Western Europe during the 20th century: the passion for the real (Badiou 2007) embodied by these demands fuelled the passage to the act that instituted them. That constitutes, for Badiou or Ranciere, a proper political sequence, and one that can be thought and practiced irrespective of any substantive social theorization – it is the political in itself at work. Of course, the current neo-liberal police order has already substantially eroded these democratic gains while traversing the symbolic order, one that now sees these demands again as scandalous and impossible. These are today among the key arenas where the principle of freedom and equality is perverted and undermined, where the scandal of democracy erupts most violently.

Another example of such political sequence erupted when, in 1981, Solidarnosc’s demands for better working conditions on the Gdansk shipyards translated into the universal demands for political rights against the oligarchic bureaucratic order of state capitalism and their apparatchiks in Poland; when the latter acknowledged the demands of the activists, their police order’s symbolic edifice and constituted order crumbled and revealed the empty locus of power. They launched a proper political sequence that would overturn the symbolic order and the distribution of functions and places associated with it. Or when civil society groups took to the streets of East Germany and demanded different rights, it started a sequence that would transform existing authoritarian state forms. Their subsequent history of course also signaled their accelerated incorporation into a post-political European order as the opened dissensual political space soon closed down again.

It is the sort of demand expressed when illegal and other immigrants in Europe or the US claim that ‘we are here, therefore we are from here’. The illegal immigrant already foreshadows of course the idealized neoliberal subject, the one without political inscription, without papers (and therefore no rights); the illegal immigrant already stands in as the subject neoliberalisation seeks to universalize, the one without papers, homo sacer, and who, consequently, has no other choice than to sell him- or herself to the highest bidder: “Nowadays, when the welfare state is gone, this separation between citizens and non-citizens still remains, but with an additional paradox that non citizens represent the avant-garde within the neo-liberal project, because they are indeed positioned within the labor force market without any kind of social rights or state protection. Thus, if we examine this problem in such a way, the sanspapiers and the erased are the avant-garde form of sociality which would prevail if the neo- liberal concept is to be fully realized, if it would not be important anymore if someone is a citizen or not, if everybody would be defined only according to their position in the labor market and the labor process” (Pupovac and Karamani 2006: 48).

Such new symbolizations through which what is considered to be noise by the police is turned into speech, is where a proper politicization of the spatial should start from, where a possible re-politicization of public civic space resides. These symbolizations should start from the premise that the promise of democracy, political equality, is ‘wronged’ by the oligarchic police order, and where those who are unaccounted for, unnamed, whose fictions are only registered as noise, claim their metaphorical and material space. Reclaiming the democratic polis as the space of dissensus, disagreement, and as the space where places for enunciating the different, for staging the voices of those unheard or unnoticed are constructed, egalibertarian voices that aspire to universalisation, is exactly where a proper democratic politics should reside. And it is exactly these practices that urgently require attention, nurturing, recognition and valorization. They demand their own space; they require the creation of their own material and cultural landscapes, their own emblematic geographies. These are the spaces where the post-political post- democratic consensus is questioned, where the right to égaliberté is asserted, practices of radical democratization experimented with, and democracy conquered; not an instituted formal arrangement that cannot but subvert itself, but one that aims at overtaking and replacing instituted post-political post-democracy.

The status quo is always an option – proving the CP worse does not justify the plan. Logical decision-making is the most portable skill.

And, presumption remains negative—the counterplan is less change and a tie goes to the runner.

## 1nc

#### Text: The United States federal government ought to enter into prior, binding consultation with the government of Brazil on whether [ ] with the possibility of minor modifications by the Brazilian government.

#### Prior binding consultation key to U.S.-Brazil relations

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A prerequisite for improved mutual engagement will be changes in perspective on both sides. Mutually beneficial engagement requires the United States to welcome Brazil’s emergence as a global power. Brazil is more than a tropical China35; it is culturally and politically close to the United States and Europe. Brazil, in turn, needs to realize that the United States accepts its rise. Brazil also needs to recognize that the United States still matters greatly to Brasilia and that more can be achieved work¬ing with Washington than against it.¶ The United States and Brazil have vast overlapping in-terests, but a formal strategic partnership is probably out of the question for both countries. In the United States, Brazil must compete for policy attention with China, India, Rus-sia, Japan, Mexico, and several European countries. It poses no security threat to the United States. Moreover, despite Brazil’s importance in multilateral organizations, particu¬larly the UN, Brazil can be of limited practical assistance at best to the United States in its two current wars. Brazil’s interests, in turn, may be fairly said to include the need to distinguish itself from the United States. Diplomatically, this means neither country can expect automatic agreement from the other. Interests differ and it may be politically nec¬essary to highlight differences even when interests are simi-lar. But both countries should make every effort to develop a habit of “permanent consultation” in an effort to coordinate policies, work pragmatically together where interests are common, and reduce surprises even while recognizing that specific interests and policies often may differ.¶ A first operational step, therefore, is for both coun-tries to hold regular policy-level consultations, increase exchanges of information, and coordinate carefully on multilateral matters. This is much easier said than done. The list of global issues on which Brazil is becoming a major player includes conflict resolution, all aspects of energy, including nuclear matters, all types of trade, the environment, space, and the development of internation¬al law, including law of the seas and nonproliferation. To share information and ensure effective consultation on so many functional issues will require finding ways to lessen the geographic stovepiping natural to bureaucracy. The U.S. Department of State, for example, has historically organized itself into geographical bureaus responsible for relations with countries in particular regions, leaving functional issues to offices organized globally. This orga¬nization hampers the exchange of information and con¬sultation with countries such as Brazil, whose reach and policies go beyond their particular geographic region. One result is that multilateral affairs are still often an isolated afterthought in the U.S. Government. Are there things the United States and Brazil could do, whether bi¬laterally or in the World Trade Organization, that would offset some of the negative effects of the China trade on manufacturing in both their countries?36 Just posing the question reveals the complexity of the task.

#### Relations solve global prolif

Trinkunas & Bruneau 12 (Harold & Thomas, Ph.D. at Naval Post Graduate School, Center on Contemporary conflict, “US Brazil Workshop on Global and Regional Security,” December 2012, <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA574567&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf>)

Brazilian participants also noted the particular alignment of domestic constituencies regarding issues such as MERCOSUR and UNASUR, which they saw as demonstrating that Brazil was a consolidated democracy that had to respond to domestic political and economic interests in much the same way that the United States government did. The United States and Brazil also look very similar in their relationship with the region, one participant said. If we actually look at the interests of United States and Brazil, they are very convergent. One Brazilian participant also added that, like the United States, Brazil is happy to retreat back to unilateralism. Brazilian participants repeatedly emphasized that Brazil is uniquely qualified to play the role of international peacemaker due to their peaceful traditions, the strength of their diplomacy, and their experience in reducing tensions during international crises. Brazilians also stressed that as a consolidated free market democracy, Brazil is inherently a responsible power in the international arena. They disagreed with the characterization of Brazil as a ‘spoiler’, a position held by some U.S. observers of global nonproliferation efforts (albeit not by the U.S. participants in this dialogue). Again and again Brazilian participants emphasized their responsible and mature behavior in important international issues, including nuclear ones. The dialogue participants from outside of the region agreed that Brazil has acquired a good reputation for its skilled diplomacy. One U.S. participant predicted that Brazil would eventually join the expanded UN Security Council as a permanent member. The Brazilians considered the U.S. and Brazil to be natural partners in international nonproliferation efforts, and both sides agreed that the international nonproliferation regime was in crisis. They offered different explanations, however, for the roots of the regime crisis. A participant from within the region added that it is difficult for Brazil and the U.S. to be on the same page or even debate nuclear issues because the two countries comes from very different ends of the nuclear spectrum. Participants observed that the NPT regime is in the midst of a legitimacy crisis. One participant said that from an institutional point of view, the original design of the regime left it unable to adapt to changes that have taken place in the international system since the Cold War. Some U.S. participants expressed optimism that the NPT has been bolstered by the Obama administration’s support for the NPT. A change in both attitude and policy from the administration has fostered a new sense of hope in the NPT’s utility. This participant added that only by fully engaging other members of the NPT can the U.S. and Brazil hope to make the non-proliferation regime stronger.

#### Extinction

Victor AUtgoff**,** Deputy Director of Strategy, Forces, and Resources Institute for Defense Analysis, Summer 2002, Survival,p.87.90

Further, the large number of states that became capable of building nuclear weapons over the years, but chose not to, can be reasonably well explained by the fact that most were formally allied with either the United States or the Soviet Union. Both these superpowers had strong nuclear forces and put great pressure on their allies not to build nuclear weapons. Since the Cold War, the US has retained all its allies. In addition, NATO has extended its protection to some of the previous allies of the Soviet Union and plans on taking in more. Nuclear proliferation by India and Pakistan, and proliferation programmes by North Korea, Iran and Iraq, all involve states in the opposite situation: all judged that they faced serious military opposition and had little prospect of establishing a reliable supporting alliance with a suitably strong, nuclear-armed state. What would await the world if strong protectors, especially the United States, were [was] no longer seen as willing to protect states from nuclear-backed aggression? At least a few additional states would begin to build their own nuclear weapons and the means to deliver them to distant targets, and these initiatives would spur increasing numbers of the world’s capable states to follow suit. Restraint would seem ever less necessary and ever more dangerous. Meanwhile, more states are becoming capable of building nuclear weapons and long-range missiles. Many, perhaps most, of the world’s states are becoming sufficiently wealthy, and the technology for building nuclear forces continues to improve and spread. Finally, it seems highly likely that at some point, halting proliferation will come to be seen as a lost cause and the restraints on it will disappear. Once that happens, the transition to a highly proliferated world would probably be very rapid. While some regions might be able to hold the line for a time, the threats posed by wildfire proliferation in most other areas could create pressures that would finally overcome all restraint. Many readers are probably willing to accept that nuclear proliferation is such a grave threat to world peace that every effort should be made to avoid it. However, every effort has not been made in the past, and we are talking about much more substantial efforts now. For new and substantially more burdensome efforts to be made to slow or stop nuclear proliferation, it needs to be established that the highly proliferated nuclear world that would sooner or later evolve without such efforts is not going to be acceptable. And, for many reasons, it is not. First, the dynamics of getting to a highly proliferated world could be very dangerous. Proliferating states will feel great pressures to obtain nuclear weapons and delivery systems before any potential opponent does. Those who succeed in outracing an opponent may consider preemptive nuclear war before the opponent becomes capable of nuclear retaliation. Those who lag behind might try to preempt their opponent’s nuclear programme or defeat the opponent using conventional forces. And those who feel threatened but are incapable of building nuclear weapons may still be able to join in this arms race by building other types of weapons of mass destruction, such as biological weapons. The war between Iran and Iraq during the 1980s led to the use of chemical weapons on both sides and exchanges of missiles against each other’s cities. And more recently, violence in the Middle East escalated in a few months from rocks and small arms to heavy weapons on one side, and from police actions to air strikes and armoured attacks on the other. Escalation of violence is also basic human nature. Once the violence starts, retaliatory exchanges of violent acts can escalate to levels unimagined by the participants before hand. Intense and blinding anger is a common response to fear or humiliation or abuse. And such anger can lead us to impose on our opponents whatever levels of violence are readily accessible. In sum, widespread proliferation is likely to lead to an occasional shoot-out with nuclear weapons, and that such shoot-outs will have a substantial probability of escalating to the maximum destruction possible with the weapons at hand. Unless nuclear proliferation is stopped, we are headed toward a world that will mirror the American Wild West of the late 1800s. With most, if not all, nations wearing nuclear 'six-shooters' on their hips, the world may even be a more polite place than it is today, but every once in a while we will all gather on a hill to bury the bodies of dead cities or even whole nations.

## Case

#### Quality of life is skyrocketing worldwide by all measures

Ridley, visiting professor at Cold Spring Harbor Laboratory, former science editor of *The Economist*, and award-winning science writer, 2010

(Matt, *The Rational Optimist*, pg. 13-15)

If my fictional family is not to your taste, perhaps you prefer statistics. Since 1800, the population of the world has multiplied six times, yet **average life expectancy has more than doubled and real income has risen more than nine times**. Taking a shorter perspective, in 2005, compared with 1955, the average human being on Planet Earth earned nearly three times as much money (corrected for inflation), ate one-third more calories of food, buried one-third as many of her children and could expect to live one-third longer. She was less likely to die as a result of war, murder, childbirth, accidents, tornadoes, flooding, famine, whooping cough, tuberculosis, malaria, diphtheria, typhus, typhoid, measles, smallpox, scurvy or polio. She was less likely, at any given age, to get cancer, heart disease or stroke. She was more likely to be literate and to have finished school. She was more likely to own a telephone, a flush toilet, a refrigerator and a bicycle. All this during a half-century when the world population has more than doubled, so that far from being rationed by population pressure, the goods and services available to the people of the world have expanded. It is, by any standard, an astonishing human achievement. Averages conceal a lot. **But even if you break down the world into bits**, **it is hard to find any region that was worse off in 2005 than it was in 1955**. Over that half-century, real income per head ended a little lower in only six countries (Afghanistan, Haiti, Congo, Liberia, Sierra Leone and Somalia), life expectancy in three (Russia, Swaziland and Zimbabwe), and infant survival in none. In the rest they have rocketed upward. Africa’s rate of improvement has been distressingly slow and patchy compared with the rest of the world, and many southern African countries saw life expectancy plunge in the 1990s as the AIDS epidemic took hold (before recovering in recent years). There were also moments in the half-century when you could have caught countries in episodes of dreadful deterioration of living standards or life chances – China in the 1960s, Cambodia in the 1970s, Ethiopia in the 1980s, Rwanda in the 1990s, Congo in the 2000s, North Korea throughout. Argentina had a disappointingly stagnant twentieth century. But overall, after fifty years, **the outcome for the world is** remarkably, astonishingly, **dramatically positive**. The average South Korean lives twenty-six more years and earns fifteen times as much income each year as he did in 1955 (and earns fifteen times as much as his North Korean counter part). The average Mexican lives longer now than the average Briton did in 1955. The average Botswanan earns more than the average Finn did in 1955. **Infant mortality is lower today in Nepal than it was in Italy in 1951**. The proportion of Vietnamese living on less than $2 a day has dropped from 90 per cent to 30 per cent in twenty years. The rich have got richer, but the poor have done even better. **The poor in the developing world grew their consumption twice as fast as the world as a whole between 1980 and 2000**. The Chinese are ten times as rich, one-third as fecund and twenty-eight years longer-lived than they were fifty years ago. Even Nigerians are twice as rich, 25 per cent less fecund and nine years longer-lived than they were in 1955. **Despite a doubling of the world population**, even **the raw number of people living in absolute poverty** (defined as less than a 1985 dollar a day) **has fallen since the 1950s**. The percentage living in such absolute poverty has dropped by more than half – to less than 18 per cent. That number is, of course, still all too horribly high, but the trend is hardly a cause for despair: at the current rate of decline, it would hit zero around 2035 – though it probably won’t. The United Nations estimates that poverty was reduced more in the last fifty years than in the previous 500.

#### The aff’s selective intervention turns itself

Arceneaux and Pion-Berlin 2005 (Craig, David, “Transforming Latin America: The International and Domestic Origins of Change”, p.219-221)

Policy Implications Knowing when and why foreign forces matter to the conduct of events in Latin America takes on policy salience as well. As Latin America moves into the twenty-first century, it faces problems of considerable gravity: democracies that are weakly institutionalized, governments that perform poorly or not at all militaries that are asked to fill functional gaps, crime and insecurity that sweep through once relatively safe and secure communities, courts that fail to bring perpetrators to justice, poverty that reaches up and grabs vast portions of an erst-while middle class, double-digit unemployment rates, and indigenous populations at the very bottom who will not wait any longer for a slice of the pie. The political life spans of Latin America's leaders have grown progressively shorter as they either cannot or will not remedy these ills; worse still, they are sometimes part of the problem. It is always at times of great frustration and great need when the question is asked: what will the wealthier industrialized countries offer this beleaguered region? And specifically, what will the United States offer? The answer is not comforting, but it is at least more comprehensible once viewed through the lens of our framework. The United States is not likely to invest any significant resources or effort in a campaign of direct economic or social assistance targeted at in-need populations. This is not a bold prediction course; the foreign aid spigot was more or less turned off years ago and remains closed. Naturally there have been both ideological and fiscal changes in the United States in recent decades that can account for the diminished importance of foreign aid. But the problem goes beyond the hegemony of fiscal conservatism to one of general hegemonic attention and motivation. U.S. governments—-whether Democratic or Republican controlled—have very little interest in any of the aforementioned problems, and less interest still in doing anything about them. Their lack of interest derives from a perception that the burdens of the region's poor, its workers, its unemployed, its peasants, its pensioners indeed its average citizens, generate no imminent threats to U.S. national interests, and efforts to assist them generate no tangible benefits in return. These are low politics difficulties that do not reach out and grab the attention of powerful executives or lawmakers from the North. This view is not just a kind of bias toward the impoverished masses. The U.S. government demonstrates an equally indifferent attitude toward the elites. It refuses to commit significant attention, expertise, or sums of money to strengthen and reform Latin America's courts, legislatures, police units, defense ministries, and other institutions of the democratic state. Elites desperately need stronger institutions if they are to govern effectively. But however vital democratic deepening may be to Latin America's future, it just does not appear on Washington's radar screen because it too resides in the realm of low politics, meaning the stakes are appreciably lower for foreign states. Scholars can wax eloquent about how the afflictions of poverty, unemployment, crime, the environment, institutional decay, and human rights left unattended now will fester and create crises that will eventually harm U.S. interests. But the arguments fall on deaf ears to policy makers who view the long term as very long indeed and who are eager to discount the future costs to their current inaction. Unless Latin America's low politics problems can cause considerable and immediate angst at a national level within the United States, they will not become a political agenda item in Washington. Washington's attention deficit is selective, and issue sensitive. Within the high politics realm of economics, the United States is willing (with some misgivings) to work toward the creation of a free trade zone with its Latin American partners. It is ideologically predisposed to do so, and it envisions a short- to medium-term gain in the form of new, expanded, and unrestricted markets for U.S. exporters and investors. But it is much less willing to associate free trade with low politics reforms within Latin American states that would humanize the workplace, boost wages, or create jobs. In the longer term, assisting Latin American workers and unemployed should, in theory, rebound to the benefit of the United States by bolstering disposable incomes, which in turn would mean greater consumption of very competitive U.S. goods. Even though there is a logical linkage between these sets of issues, it is still perceived as an indirect and less urgent connection and one that Washington policy makers seldom make. They would rather place their bets on a free trade deal alone that quickly solidifies their nation's export earnings and profit remittances. Similar issue splits are visible elsewhere. The United States wants Latin American armed forces to leap into wars against guerrillas and terrorists but shows little concern that military immersion in these campaigns might have negative consequences for professionalism, democratic society, and civilian control in those countries. It devotes scant resources to help fully professionalize those forces and less still to equip civilians with the tools they need to institutionalize control over their soldiers. It wants its Southern neighbors to fight hard against transnational crime but will not help finance judicial reform that would allow Latin American courts to process their criminal caseloads more efficiently and prosecute more frequently, or help fund police reform to reduce the rampant corruption of those units. The United States visualizes the struggle against left-wing insurgents, terrorists, and their criminal associates as high-stakes contests of high politics that must be won to enhance its own national security and that of its allies in those struggles; it does not visualize improvements in Latin American civil-military relations or judicial and police systems in quite the same way. In not addressing the latter issues, the United States may be cutting off its nose to spite its face. Without low politics reforms to assist Latin American judges, police, investigators, soldiers, and their civilian managers, those groups will be less equipped to lend a hand in transnational struggles deemed vital by Washington. But so it goes. The hegemon's indifference to these groups and their problems persists, and the balance of influence remains tilted in the direction of domestic politics and away from the foreign. On these issues, Latin America is left to fend for itself, and only time will tell whether its independence proves to be a blessing or a curse.

#### The aff is coopted – historic examples like the Bracero program prove that allowing government control of visas is just as bad as allowing employer control – the US government is part and parcel of our economic system – Cross-ex proves

Al Gore 1-29 (2013, He Created the Series of Tubez we call the Internets, *The Future*, Chapter 3 on Kindle edition)

WITH A TIGHTLY INTEGRATED GLOBAL ECONOMY AND A PLANET-WIDE digital network, we are witnessing the birth of the world’s first truly global civilization. As knowledge and economic power are multiplied and dispersed far more widely and swiftly than by the Print and Industrial Revolutions, the political equilibrium of the world is undergoing a massive change on a scale not seen since the decades following Europe’s linkage by sea routes to the Americas and Asia 500 years ago. As a result, the balance of power among nations is changing dramatically. Just as the Industrial Revolution led to the dominance of the world economy by Western Europe and the United States, the emergence of Earth Inc. is shifting economic power from West to East and spreading it to the new growth economies developing throughout the world. China, in particular, is overtaking the U.S. as the center of gravity in the global economy. More importantly, just as nation-states emerged as the dominant form of political organization in the wake of the printing press, the emergence of the Global Mind is changing many of the social and political assumptions on which the nation-state system was based. Some of the sources of power traditionally wielded primarily by nations are no longer as firmly under their exclusive control. While our individual political identities remain primarily national, and will for a long time to come, the simultaneous globalization of information and markets is transferring power once reserved for national governments to private actors— including multinational corporations, networked entrepreneurs, and billions of individuals in the global middle class. No nation can escape these powerful waves of change by unilaterally imposing its own design. The choices most relevant to our future are now ones that confront the world as a whole. But because nation-states retain the exclusive power to negotiate policies and implement them globally, the only practical way to reclaim control of our destiny is to seek a global consensus within the community of nations to secure the implementation of policies that protect human values. And since the end of World War II— at least until recently— most of the world has looked primarily to the United States of America for leadership when facing the need for such a consensus. Many fear, however, that the ability of the U.S. to provide leadership in the world is declining in relative terms. In 2010, China became the world’s leading manufacturing nation, ending a period of U.S. leadership that had lasted for 110 years. An economic historian at Nuffield College, Oxford, Robert Allen, said this milestone marked the “closing of a 500-year cycle in economic history.” When China’s overall economic strength surpasses that of the United States later this decade, it will mark the first time since 1890 that any economy in the world has been larger than the American economy. Worse, not since the 1890s has U.S. government decision making been as feeble, dysfunctional, and servile to corporate and other special interests as it is now. The gravity of the danger posed by this debasement of American democracy is still not widely understood. The subordination of reason-based analysis to the influence of wealth and power in U.S. decision making has led to catastrophically bad policy choices, sclerotic decision making, and a significant weakening of U.S. influence in the world. Even a relative decline in the preeminence of the U.S. position in the world system has significant consequences. It remains “the indispensable nation” in reducing the potential for avoidable conflicts— keeping the sea lanes open, monitoring and countering terrorist groups, and playing a balancing role in tense regions like the Middle East and East Asia, and in regions (like Europe) that could face new tensions without strong U.S. leadership. Among its many other roles, the United States has also exercised responsibility for maintaining relative stability in the world’s international monetary system and has organized responses to periodic market crises. At the moment, though, the degradation of the U.S. political system is causing a dangerous deficit of governance in the world system and a gap between the problems that need to be addressed and the vision and cooperation necessary to address them. This is the real fulcrum in the world’s balance of power today— and it is badly in need of repair. In the absence of strong U.S. leadership, the community of nations is apparently no longer able to coalesce in support of international coordination and agreements that establish the cooperative governance arrangements necessary for the solution of global problems. Meetings of the G20 (which now commands more attention than the G8) have become little more than a series of annual opportunities for the leaders of its component nations to issue joint press releases. Their habit of wearing matching colorful shirts that represent the fashion motif of the host nation recalls the parable of the child who noticed that the emperor has no clothes. Except in this case, the clothes have no emperor. Largely because of U.S. government decisions to follow the lead of powerful domestic corporate interests, once-hopeful multilateral negotiations— like the Doha Round of trade talks (commenced in 2001) and the Kyoto Protocol (commenced in 1997)— are now sometimes characterized as “zombies.” That is, they are neither alive nor dead; they just stagger around and scare people. Similarly, the Law of the Sea Treaty is in a condition of stasis. The global institutions established with U.S. leadership after World War II— the United Nations, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the World Trade Organization (formerly the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade)— are now largely ineffective because of the global changes that have shaken the geopolitical assumptions upon which they were based. Chief among them was the assumption that the U.S. would provide global leadership. So long as the United States offered the vision necessary for these institutions— and so long as most of the world trusted that U.S. leadership would move the world community in a direction that benefited all— these institutions often worked well. If any nation’s goals are seen as being motivated by the pursuit of goals that are in the interest of all, its political power is greatly enhanced. By contrast, if the nation offering leadership to the world is seen as primarily promoting its own narrower interests— the commercial prospects of its corporations, for example— its capacity for leadership is diminished. Two thirds of a century after their birth, these multilateral institutions face criticism from developing countries, environmentalists, and advocates for the poor because of what many see as “democratic deficits.” Both the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund require support from 85 percent of the voting rights held by member nations. Since the United States alone has more than 15 percent of the voting rights in both organizations, it has effective veto power over their decisions. Similarly, some countries ask why France and the United Kingdom are still among only five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council when Brazil, with a GDP larger than either, and India, whose GDP is greater than both combined and will soon be the most populous country in the world, are not. The significant loss of confidence in U.S. leadership, especially since the economic crisis of 2007– 08, has accelerated the shift in the equilibrium of power in the world. Some experts predict the emergence of a new equilibrium with both the United States and China sharing power at its center; some have already preemptively labeled it the “G2.” RELATIVE OR ABSOLUTE DECLINE? Other experts predict an unstable, and more dangerous, multipolar world. It seems most likely that the increasing integration of global markets and information flows will lead to an extended period of uncertainty before global power settles into a new more complex equilibrium that may not be defined by poles of power at all. The old division of the world into rich nations and poor nations is changing as many formerly poor nations now have faster economic growth rates than the wealthy developed nations. As the gap closes between these fast-growing developing and emerging economies on the one hand and the wealthy mature economies on the other, economic and political power are not only shifting from West to East, but are also being widely dispersed throughout the world: to São Paulo, Mumbai, Jakarta, Seoul, Taipei, Istanbul, Johannesburg, Lagos, Mexico City, Singapore, and Beijing. Whatever new equilibrium of power emerges, its configuration will be determined by the resolution of several significant uncertainties about the future of the United States, China, and nation-states generally: First, is the United States really in a period of decline? If so, can the decline be reversed? And if not, is it merely relative to that of other nations, or is there a danger of an absolute decline? Second, is China likely to continue growing at its current rate or are there weaknesses in the foundations on which its prosperity is being built? Finally, are nation-states themselves losing relative power in the age of Earth Inc. and the Global Mind? There is a lively dispute among scholars about whether the United States is in decline at all. The loss of U.S. geopolitical power has been a recurring theme for far longer than many Americans realize. Even before the U.S. became the most powerful nation, there were episodic warnings that American power was waning. Some argue that concerns about China overtaking the United States in forms of power other than economic output represent just another example of what happened when so many were concerned about Japan Inc. in the 1970s and 1980s— and even earlier concerns when the former Soviet Union was seen as a threat to U.S. dominance in the 1950s and 1960s. For more than a decade following World War II, many strategic thinkers worried that the U.S. was in danger of quickly falling from the pinnacle of world power. When the USSR acquired nuclear weapons and tightened its grip on Eastern and Central Europe, these fears grew. When Sputnik was launched in 1957, making the USSR the first nation in space, the warning bells rung by declinists were heard even more loudly. Many of the alarms currently being sounded about the decline of U.S. power are based on a comparison between our present difficulties and a misremembered sense of how completely the U.S. dominated global decision making in the second half of the twentieth century. A more realistic and textured view would take into account the fact that there was never a golden age in which U.S. designs were implemented successfully without resistance and multiple failures. It is also worth remembering that while the U.S. share of global economic output fell from 50 percent in the late 1940s to roughly 25 percent in the early 1970s, it has remained at that same level for the last forty years. The rise of China’s share of global GDP and the economic strength of other emerging and developing economies has come largely at the expense of Europe, not the United States. The rise of the United States as the dominant global power began early in the twentieth century when it first became the world’s largest economy, when President Theodore Roosevelt aggressively asserted U.S. diplomatic and military power, and when it played the crucial role in determining the outcome of World War I under President Woodrow Wilson. And of course after providing the decisive economic and military strength to defeat the Axis powers in World War II, the United States emerged as the victor in both the European and Pacific theaters and was recognized as the leading power in the world. The economies of the European nations had been devastated and exhausted by the war. Those of Japan and Germany had been destroyed. The Soviet Union, having suffered casualties 100 times greater than those of the United States, had been weakened. Whatever antithetical moral authority it might have once aspired to under Lenin had been long since destroyed by Stalin’s 1939 pact with Hitler and his exceptional cruelty and brutality toward his own people. Moving quickly, the United States provided crucial leadership to establish the postwar institutions for world order and global governance. These included the Bretton Woods Agreement, which formalized the U.S. dollar as the world’s reserve currency, and a series of regional military self-defense alliances, the most important of which was NATO, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. By using foreign aid and generous trade agreements that provided access to U.S. markets, the United States grew into an even more dominant role. And the United States promoted democratic capitalism throughout the noncommunist parts of the world.

It catalyzed the emergence of European economic and political integration by midwifing the European Coal and Steel Community (which later evolved into the Common Market and the European Union). And the visionary and generous Marshall Plan lifted the nations of Europe that had been devastated by World War II to prosperity and encouraged a commitment to democracy and regional integration. Secretary of State Cordell Hull, who was described by FDR as “the father of the United Nations,” was an advocate of freer reciprocal cross-border trade in Europe and the world, arguing that “when goods cross borders, armies do not.” By presiding over the reconstruction, democratization, and demilitarization of Japan, the United States also solidified its position as the dominant power in Asia. In 1949, when the Soviet Union became the world’s second nuclear power and China embraced communism after the victory of Mao Zedong, the four-decade Cold War imposed its own dynamic on the operations of the world system. The nuclear standoff between the U.S. and the USSR was accompanied by a global struggle between two ideologies with competing designs for the organization of both politics and economics. For several decades, the structure of the world’s equilibrium of power was defined by the constant tension between these two polar opposites. At one pole, the United States led an alliance of nations that included the recovering democracies of Western Europe and a reconstructed Japan, all of whom advocated the ideology of democratic capitalism. At the other pole, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics led a captive group of nations in Central and Eastern Europe in advocating the ideology of communism. This abbreviated description belies more complex dynamics, of course, but virtually every political and military conflict in the world was shaped by this larger struggle. When the Soviet Union was unable to compete with the economic strength of the United States (and was unable to adapt its command economy and authoritarian political culture to the early stages of the Information Revolution), it imploded. With the collapse of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the subsequent breakup of the Soviet Union two years later (when Russia itself withdrew from the USSR), communism disappeared from the world as a serious ideological competitor. U.S. HEGEMONY IN the world thus reached its peak, and the ideology of democratic capitalism spread so widely that one political philosopher speculated that we were seeing “the end of history”— implying that no further challenge to either democracy or capitalism was likely to emerge. This ideological and political victory secured for the United States universal recognition as the dominant power in what appeared to be, at least for a brief period, a unipolar world. But once again, the superficial label concealed complex changes that accompanied the shift in the power equilibrium. Well before the beginning of World War II, Soviet communism had run afoul of a basic truth about power that was clearly understood by the founders of the United States: when too much power is concentrated in the hands of one or a small group of people, it corrupts their judgment and their humanity. American democracy, by contrast, was based on a sophisticated understanding of human nature, the superior quality of decision making to be found in what is now sometimes called the wisdom of crowds, and lessons learned from the history of the Roman Republic about the dangers posed to liberty by centralized power. Unhealthy concentrations of power were recognized to be detrimental to the survival of freedom. So power was separated into competing domains designed to check and balance one another in order to maintain a safe equipoise within which individuals could maintain their freedom to speak, worship, and assemble freely. The ability of any nation to persuade others to follow its leadership is often greatly influenced by its moral authority. In the case of the United States, it is undeniably true that since the ratification of its Constitution and Bill of Rights in 1790– 91, its founding principles have resonated in the hearts and minds of people throughout the world, no matter the country in which they live. Since the end of the eighteenth century, there have been three waves of democracy that spread throughout the world. The first, in the aftermath of the American Revolution, produced twenty-nine democracies. When the Great Liberator, Simón Bolívar, led democratic revolutions in South America in the two decades after America’s founding, he carried a picture of George Washington in his breast pocket. This was followed by a period of decline that shrank the number to twelve by the beginning of World War II. After 1945, the second wave of democratization swelled the number of democracies to thirty-six, but once again this expansion was followed by a decline to thirty from 1962 until the mid-1970s. The third wave began in the mid-1970s and then accelerated with the collapse of communism in 1989. The struggle within the United States over policies that promote the higher values reflected in the U.S. Constitution— individual rights, for example— has often been lost to the interests of business and calculations of realpolitik. When Western European countries began to grant independence to their overseas colonies and pull back from the spheres of influence they had established during their imperial periods, the United States partially filled the resulting power vacuums by extending aid and forming economic, political, and military relationships with many of the newly independent nations. When the United States feared that the withdrawal of France from its colonial role in Vietnam might lead to the expansion of what some mistakenly viewed as a quasi-monolithic communist sphere, this misunderstanding of Ho Chi Minh’s fundamentally nationalist motivation contributed to the tragic miscalculation that resulted in the Vietnam War. Nevertheless, in spite of its strategic mistake in Vietnam (following the earlier long and costly stalemate in the Korean War), heavy-handed military interventions in Latin America, and other difficult challenges, the U.S. consolidated its position of leadership in the world. The unprecedented growth of U.S. prosperity in the decades following World War II— along with its continued advocacy of freedom— made it an aspirational model for other countries. It is difficult to imagine that human rights and self-determination could have made as much progress throughout the world in the post– World War II era without the U.S. being in a dominant position. More recently, the spread of democracy has slowed. Since the market crisis of 2007– 08, there has been a decline in the number of democratic nations in the world and a degradation in the quality and extent of democracy in several others— including the United States. But even though the world is still in a “democratic recession,” some believe that the Arab Spring and other Internet-empowered democratic movements may signal the beginning of a fourth wave of democratization, though the results are still ambiguous at best. In any case, it is premature to predict an absolute decline in U.S power. Among positive signs that the United States may yet slow its relative decline, the U.S. university system is still far and away the best in the world. Its venture investment culture continues to make the U.S. the greatest source of innovation and creativity. Although the U.S. military budget is lower as a percentage of GDP than it has been for most of the post– World War II era, it has increased in absolute terms to the highest level since 1945. The U.S. military is still by far the most powerful, best trained (by the best officer corps), best equipped, and most lavishly financed armed force the world has ever seen. Its annual budget is equal to the combined military budgets of the next fifty militaries in the world and almost equal to the military spending of the entire rest of the world put together. AS SOMEONE WHO was frequently described as a pro-defense Democrat during my service in the Congress and in the White House, I have seen how valuable it has been for the United States and for the cause of freedom to maintain unquestioned military superiority. However, after more than a decade of fighting two seemingly endless wars, while simultaneously maintaining large deployments in Europe and Asia, U.S. military resources are strained to the point of breaking. And the relative decline of America’s economic power and wealth is beginning to force the reconsideration of such large military budgets. The same global trends that have dispersed productive activity throughout Earth Inc. and connected people throughout the world to the Global Mind are also dispersing technologies relevant to warfare, which used to be monopolized by nation-states. The ability to launch destructive cyberattacks, for example, is now being widely spread on the Internet. Some of the means of waging violent warfare are being robosourced and outsourced. The use of drones and other semiautonomous robotic weapons proliferated dramatically during the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. The U.S. Air Force now trains more pilots for unmanned vehicles than it trains pilots of manned fighter jets. (Interestingly, the drone pilots suffer post-traumatic stress disorder at the same rate as fighter pilots even though they see their targets over a television screen thousands of miles away.) On several occasions, drones have been hacked by the forces they are targeting. In 2010, intelligence analysts found that Islamic militants in Iraq used commercially available software selling for $ 26 to hack into the unencrypted video signals coming from U.S. drones and watch the same video in real time that was being sent to the U.S. controllers back in the United States. In Afghanistan, insurgent forces were able to do the same thing, and at the end of 2011, Iran hacked into the control system of a U.S. stealth drone and commanded it to land on an airstrip in Kashmar, Iran. A new generation of robotic weapons in the air, on the land, and in the sea is being rapidly developed. More than fifty countries are now experimenting with semiautonomous military robots of their own. (A new legal doctrine of “robot rights” has been developed by U.S. military lawyers to give unmanned drones and robots the legal right to unleash deadly fire when threatened, just as a fighter pilot has the right to fire at a potential attacker as soon as he is alerted to the fact that a targeting radar has “lit up” his plane.) At the same time, some dangerous combat missions are being outsourced. During the war in Iraq, the United States shifted significant operations in the war zone to private contractors.\* After the unpopular Vietnam War, the United States abandoned the draft and has since relied on a professional volunteer army— which many claim emotionally insulates the American people from some of the impact wars used to have on the general population. THE CHINA ISSUE Meanwhile, China’s military budgets— while still only a fraction of U.S. defense spending— are increasing. Yet there are questions about the sustainability of China’s present economic buildup. Many feel that it is premature to predict a future in which China becomes the dominant global power, or even occupies the center of a new power equilibrium alongside the United States, because they doubt that the social, political, and economic foundations in China are durable. In spite of the economic progress in China, experts warn that the lack of free speech, the concentrated autocratic power in Beijing, and the high levels of corruption throughout China’s political and economic system raise questions about the sustainability of its recent growth rates. For example, at the end of 2010, there were an estimated 64 million empty apartments in China. The building bubble there has been attributed to a number of causes, but for several years visitors have remarked upon the large number of subsidized high-rise apartment buildings that spring up quickly and remain unoccupied for very long periods of time. According to research by Morgan Stanley, almost 30 percent of the windmills constructed by China are not connected to the electrical grid; many have been placed in remote locations with strong winds but no economical way to extend the grid to them. China’s success in building its capacity to construct renewable energy systems of low cost has been of benefit to China and to the global market, but as with the many empty apartment buildings, the idle windmills serve as a warning that some trends in the Chinese economic miracle may not continue at the same pace. China’s banking system suffers from the same distortions of state manipulation. Some state-owned banks are recycling their allocations of credit into black market lending at usurious and unsustainable interest rates. There are also questions about China’s social and political cohesion during what has already been a disruptive economic transition, accompanied by the largest internal migration in history and horrendous levels of pollution. Although precise statistics are hard to verify, a professor at Tsinghua University, Sun Liping, estimated that in 2010 there were “180,000 protests, riots and other mass incidents.” That number reflects a fourfold increase from 2000.

Numerous other reports confirm that social unrest appears to be building in response to economic inequality, intolerable environmental conditions, and opposition to property seizures and other abuses by autocratic local and regional leaders. Partly as a result of dissatisfaction and unrest— particularly among internal migrant workers— wages have been increasing significantly in the last two years. Some scholars have cautioned against a Western bias in prematurely predicting instability in countries whose governments do not gain democratic legitimacy. In China, according to some experts, legitimacy can be and is derived from other sources besides the participatory nature of their system. Since Confucian times, legitimacy has been gained in the eyes of the governed when the policies implemented are successful and when the persons placed in positions of power are seen to have earned their power in a form of meritocracy and demonstrate sufficient wisdom to seem well chosen. IT IS PRECISELY these sources of legitimacy that are now most at risk in the United States. The sharp decline of public trust in government at all levels— and public trust in most all large institutions— is based in large measure on the perception that they are all failing to produce successful policies and outcomes. The previous prominence of reason-based decision making in the U.S. democratic system was its greatest source of strength. The ability of the United States, with only 5 percent of the world’s people, to lead the world for as long as it has is due in no small measure to the creativity, boldness, and effectiveness of its decision making in the past. Ironically, the economic growth in China since the reforms of Deng Xiaoping, launched in 1978, were brought about not only by his embrace of a Chinese form of capitalism but also by his intellectual victory within the Chinese Central Committee in advocating reason-based analysis as the justification for abandoning stale communist economic dogma— and his political skill in portraying this dramatic shift as simply a reaffirmation of Maoist doctrine. In a speech to the All-Army Conference in the year his reforms were begun, Deng said, “Isn’t it true that seeking truth from facts, proceeding from reality and integrating theory with practice form the fundamental principle of Mao Zedong Thought?” One reason for the rise of the United States over its first two centuries to the preeminent position among nations was that American democracy demonstrated a genius for “seeking truth from facts.” Over time, it produced better decisions and policies to promote its national interests than the government of any other nation. The robust debate that takes place when democratic institutions are healthy and functioning well results in more creative and visionary initiatives than any other system of government has proven capable of producing. Unfortunately, however, the U.S. no longer has a well-functioning self-government. To use a phrase common in the computer software industry, American democracy has been hacked. The United States Congress, the avatar of the democratically elected national legislatures in the modern world, is now incapable of passing laws without permission from the corporate lobbies and other special interests that control their campaign finances. THE LONG REACH OF CORPORATIONS It is now common for lawyers representing corporate lobbies to sit in the actual drafting sessions where legislation is written, and to provide the precise language for new laws intended to remove obstacles to their corporate business plans— usually by weakening provisions of existing laws and regulations intended to protect the public interest against documented excesses and abuses. Many U.S. state legislatures often now routinely rubber-stamp laws that have been written in their entirety by corporate lobbies. Having served as an elected official in the federal government for the last quarter of the twentieth century, and having observed it closely before that period and since, I have felt a sense of shock and dismay at how quickly the integrity and efficacy of American democracy has nearly collapsed. There have been other periods in American history when wealth and corporate power have dominated the operations of government, but there are reasons for concern that this may be more than a cyclical phenomenon— particularly recent court decisions that institutionalize the dominance and control of wealth and corporate power. This crippling of democracy comes at a time of sweeping and tumultuous change in the world system, when the need for U.S. advocacy of democratic principles and human values has never been greater. The crucial decisions facing the world are unlikely to be made well, or at all, without bold and creative U.S. leadership. It is therefore especially important to restore the integrity of U.S. democracy. But in order to do so, it is necessary to accurately diagnose how it went so badly off track. The shift of power from democracy to markets and corporations has a long history. In general, political freedom and economic freedom have reinforced one another. The new paradigm born in the era of the printing press was based on the principle that individuals had dignity, and when armed with the free flow of information could best chart their own destinies in both the political and economic realms by aggregating their collective wisdom through regular elections of representatives, and through the “invisible hand” of supply and demand. Throughout history, capitalism has been more conducive to higher levels of political and religious freedom than any other way of organizing economic activity. But internal tensions in the compound ideology of democratic capitalism have always been present and frequently difficult to reconcile. Just as America’s founders feared concentrated political power, many of them also worried about the impact on democracy of too much concentrated economic power— particularly in the form of corporations. The longest running corporation was created in Sweden in 1347, though the legal form did not become common until the seventeenth century, when the Netherlands and the United Kingdom allowed a proliferation of corporate charters, especially for the exploitation of trade to and from their new overseas colonies. After a series of spectacular frauds and other abuses, including the South Sea Company scandal (which gave birth to the economic concept of a “bubble”), England banned corporations in 1720. (The prohibition was not lifted until 1825 when the Industrial Revolution required the capitalization of railway companies and other new firms to exploit emerging technologies.) The American revolutionaries were keenly aware of this history and originally chartered corporations mostly for civic and charitable purposes, and only for limited periods of time. Business corporations came later, in response to the need to raise capital for industrialization. Referring to the English experience, Thomas Jefferson wrote in a letter to U.S. Senator George Logan of Pennsylvania in 1816, “I hope we shall take warning from the example and crush in its birth the aristocracy of our monied corporations which dare already to challenge our government to a trial of strength and bid defiance to the laws of our country.” Between 1781 and 1790 the number of corporations expanded by an order of magnitude, from 33 to 328. Then in 1811, New York State enacted the first of many statutes that allowed the proliferation of corporations without specific and narrow limitations imposed by government. So long as the vast majority of Americans lived and worked on farms, corporations remained relatively small and their impact on the conditions of labor and the quality of life was relatively limited. But during the Civil War, corporate power increased considerably with the mobilization of Northern industry, huge government procurement contracts, and the building of the railroads. In the years following the war, the corporate role in American life grew quickly, and the efforts by corporations to take control of the decisions in Congress and state legislatures grew as well. The tainted election of 1876 (deadlocked on election night by disputed electoral votes in the state of Florida) was, according to historians, settled in secret negotiations in which corporate wealth and power played the decisive role, setting the stage for a period of corrupt deal making that eventually led the new president, Rutherford B. Hayes, to complain that “this is a government of the people, by the people and for the people no longer. It is a government of corporations, by corporations, and for corporations.” As the Industrial Revolution began to reshape America, industrial accidents became commonplace. Between 1888 and 1908, 700,000 American workers were killed in industrial accidents— approximately 100 every day. In addition to providing brutal working conditions, employers also held wages as low as possible. Efforts by employees to obtain relief from these abuses by organizing strikes and seeking the passage of protective legislation provoked a fierce reaction from corporate owners. Private police forces brutalized those attempting to organize labor unions and lawyers and lobbyists flooded the U.S. Capitol and state legislatures. When corporations began hiring lobbyists to influence the writing of laws, the initial reaction was one of disgust. In 1853, the U.S. Supreme Court voided and made unenforceable a contingency contract involving lobbying— in part because those providing the money did so in secret. The justices concluded that such lobbying was harmful to public policy because it “tends to corrupt or contaminate, by improper influences, the integrity of our  …   political institutions” and “sully the purity or mislead the judgments of those to whom the high trust of legislation is confided” with “undue influences” that have “all the injurious effects of a direct fraud on the public.” Twenty years later, the U.S. Supreme Court addressed the question once again, invalidating contingency contracts for lobbyists with these words: “If any of the great corporations of the country were to hire adventurers who make market of themselves in this way, to procure the passage of a general law with a view to the promotion of their private interests, the moral sense of every right-minded man would instinctively denounce the employer and employed as steeped in corruption, and the employment as infamous. If the instances were numerous, open and tolerated, they would be regarded as measuring the decay of the public morals and the degeneracy of the times.” The state of Georgia’s new constitution explicitly banned the lobbying of legislators. Nevertheless, the “promotion of private interests” in legislation grew by leaps and bounds as larger and larger fortunes were made during the heyday of the Industrial Revolution— and as the impact of general laws on corporate opportunities grew. During the Robber Baron era of the 1880s and 1890s, according to the definitive history by Matthew Josephson, “The halls of legislation were transformed into a mart where the price of votes was haggled over, and laws, made to order, were bought and sold.” It was during this corrupt era that the U.S. Supreme Court first designated corporations as “persons” entitled to some of the protections of the Fourteenth Amendment in an 1886 decision (Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific Railroad Company). The decision itself, in favor of the Southern Pacific, did not actually address the subject of corporate “personhood,” but language that some historians believe was written by Justice Stephen Field was added in the “headnotes” of the case by the court reporter, who was the former president of a railway company. The chief justice had signaled before hearing the oral arguments that “the court does not wish to hear argument on the question of whether  …   the Fourteenth Amendment  …   applies to these corporations. We are all of the opinion that it does.” (This backhanded precedent for the doctrine of corporate personhood was relied upon by conservative Supreme Courts in the late twentieth century for extensions of “individual rights” to corporations— and in the Citizens United decision in 2010.) This pivotal case has an interesting connection to the first nerve endings of the worldwide communications networks that later became the Global Mind. The brother of Justice Field, Cyrus Field, laid the first transoceanic telegraph cable in 1858. A third Field brother, David (whose large campaign contributions to Abraham Lincoln had resulted in Stephen’s appointment to the Supreme Court), happened to be in Paris with his family during the Paris Commune in 1871, and used the telegraph cable to send news of the riots, disorder, and subsequent massacre back to the United States in real time. It was the first time in history that an overseas news event was followed in the United States, as it unfolded, on a daily basis. Though the Paris Commune had complex causes (including the bitter emotions surrounding the French defeat in the Franco-Prussian War that month and the struggle between republicans and monarchists), it became the first symbolic clash between communism and capitalism.† Karl Marx had published Das Kapital just four years earlier and wrote The Civil War in France during the two months of the Commune, saying that it would be “forever celebrated as the glorious harbinger of a new society.” A half century later, at Lenin’s funeral, his body was wrapped in a torn and tattered red and white flag that had been flown by Parisians during the two months of the Commune. But as much as the Paris Commune inspired communists, it terrified elites in the United States, among them Justice Field, who was obsessively following the daily reports from his brother and journalists in Paris. The Paris Commune received more press coverage— almost all of it hostile— than any other story that year besides government corruption. The fear provoked by the Commune was magnified by labor unrest in the U.S., particularly by many who had arrived since the 1830s from the poorer countries of Europe in search of a better life but had been victimized by the unregulated abuses in low-wage industrial jobs. Two years later, the U.S. was plunged into a depression by the bankruptcy of financier and railroad entrepreneur Jay Cooke. Wages fell even lower and unemployment climbed even higher. The New York Times warned, “There is a ‘dangerous class’ in New York, quite as much as in Paris, and they want only the opportunity or the incentive to spread abroad the anarchy and ruin of the French Commune.” According to historians, Justice Field was so radicalized by the Commune and what he feared were its implications for U.S. class warfare that he decided to make it his mission to strengthen corporations. His strategy was to use the new Fourteenth Amendment, which had been designed to confer the constitutional rights of persons on the freed slaves, as a vehicle for extending the rights of persons to corporations instead. By the last decade of the nineteenth century, concentrated corporate power had attained such a shocking degree of control over American democracy that it triggered a populist reaction. When the Industrial Revolution resulted in the mass migration of Americans from farms to cities, and public concern grew over excesses and abuses such as child labor, long working hours, low wages, dangerous work environments, and unsafe food and medicines, reformers worked within the democracy sphere to demand new government policies and protections in the marketplace. The Progressive movement at the turn of the twentieth century began implementing new laws to rein in corporate power, including the first broad antitrust law, the Sherman Act of 1898, though the Supreme Court sharply limited its constitutionality, as it limited the application and enforcement of virtually all Progressive legislation. In 1901, after the pro-corporate president William McKinley was assassinated only six months into his term, Theodore Roosevelt unexpectedly became president, and the following year launched an extraordinary assault on monopolies and abuses of overbearing corporate power. Roosevelt established the Bureau of Corporations inside his new Department of Commerce and Labor. He launched an antitrust suit to break up J. P. Morgan’s Northern Securities Corporation, which included 112 corporations worth a combined $ 571 billion (in 2012 dollars), at the beginning of the twentieth century, and was worth “twice the total assessed value of all property in thirteen states in the southern United States.” This was followed by forty more antitrust suits. A seemingly inexhaustible source of presidential energy, Roosevelt also passed the Pure Food and Drug Act and protected more than 230 million acres of land, including the Grand Canyon, the Muir Woods, and the Tongass forest reserve— all while building the Panama Canal and winning the Nobel Peace Prize for resolving the Russo-Japanese War. Roosevelt made a fateful decision at the beginning of his presidency not to run for a second full term in 1908, noting that he had served almost the full eight years that George Washington had established as the “wise custom” by serving only two terms. When Roosevelt’s handpicked successor, William Howard Taft, abandoned many of TR’s reforms, the march of corporate power resumed. In response, Roosevelt began to organize his Bull Moose Party campaign to replace Taft as president in the election of 1912. In October of 1910, Roosevelt said, “Exactly as the special interests of cotton and slavery threatened our political integrity before the Civil War, so now the great special business interests too often control and corrupt the men and methods of government for their own profit.” Eighteen months later, in the midst of the campaign, he said that his party was engaged in a struggle for its soul: The Republican party is now facing a great crisis. It is to decide whether it will be, as in the days of Lincoln, the party of the plain people, the party of progress, the party of social and industrial justice; or whether it will be the party of privilege and of special interests, the heir to those who were Lincoln’s most bitter opponents, the party that represents the great interests within and without Wall Street which desire through their control over the servants of the public to be kept immune from punishment when they do wrong and to be given privileges to which they are not entitled. After Roosevelt lost that campaign to Woodrow Wilson (Taft came in third), he continued to speak out forcefully in favor of Progressive reforms and a rollback of corporate power. He said that the most important test of the country remained “the struggle of free men to gain and hold the right of self-government as against the special interests, who twist the methods of free government into machinery for defeating the popular will.” He proposed that the U.S. “prohibit the use of corporate funds directly or indirectly for political purposes,” and in speech after speech, argued that the Constitution “does not give the right of suffrage to any corporation.” Thanks in part to his vigorous advocacy, the Progressive movement gained strength, passing a constitutional amendment to reverse the Supreme Court’s prohibition against an income tax, enacting an inheritance tax, and enacting numerous regulations to rein in corporate abuses. The many Progressive reforms continued during Woodrow Wilson’s presidency, but the pendulum shifted back toward corporate dominance of democracy during the Warren Harding administration— remembered for its corruption, including the Teapot Dome scandal in which oil company executives secretly bribed Harding administration officials for access to oil on public lands. Following three pro-corporate Republican presidents, President Franklin Roosevelt launched the second wave of reform when he took office in 1933 in the midst of the suffering caused by the Great Depression that was triggered by the stock market crash of 1929. The New Deal expanded federal power in the marketplace to a formidable scale and scope. But once again the conservative Supreme Court stopped many of the Progressive initiatives, declaring them unconstitutional. Theodore Roosevelt had declared the justices “a menace to the welfare of the nation” and FDR essentially did the same. But he went further, proposing a court-packing plan to add to the number of justices on the court in an effort to dilute the power of the pro-business majority. Historians differ on whether Roosevelt’s threat was the cause or not, but a few months later the Supreme Court reversed course and began approving the constitutionality of most New Deal proposals. To this day, some right-wing legal advocates refer to the court’s switch as a “betrayal.” In the twenty-first century, right-wing judicial activists are trying to return court rulings to the philosophy that existed prior to the New Deal. In spite of FDR’s initiatives, the U.S. found it difficult to escape hard times, and slipped back into depression in 1938. Then, when America mobilized to respond to the totalitarian threat from Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan, the Depression finally ended. After the U.S. emerged victorious, its remarkable economic expansion continued for more than three decades. By then, the consensus in favor of an expanded role for the federal government in addressing national problems was supported by a majority of voters across the political spectrum. In the turbulent decade of the 1960s, however, the seeds of a corporate-led counterreform movement were planted. After the assassination of President John F. Kennedy in the fall of 1963, a variety of social reform movements swept the nation— driven in part by the restless energy and idealism of the huge postwar baby boom generation just entering young adulthood. The civil rights movement, the women’s movement, the first gay rights demonstrations, the consumer rights movement, Lyndon Johnson’s War on Poverty, and the escalating protests against the continuation of the ill-considered proxy war against communism in Southeast Asia all combined to produce a fearful reaction by corporate interests and conservative ideologues. Just as the Paris Commune had radicalized Justice Stephen Field 100 years earlier, the social movements in the U.S. during the 1960s also awakened a fear of disorder, radicalized a generation of right-wing market fundamentalists, and instilled a sense of mission in soon-to-be Supreme Court Justice Lewis Powell. Powell, a Richmond lawyer then best known for representing the tobacco industry after the surgeon general’s 1964 linkage of cigarettes to lung cancer, wrote a lengthy and historic 1971 memorandum for the U.S. Chamber of Commerce in which he presented a comprehensive plan for a sustained and massively funded long-term effort to change the nature of the U.S. Congress, state legislatures, and the judiciary in order to tilt the balance in favor of corporate interests. Powell was appointed to the Supreme Court by President Nixon two months later— though his plan for the Chamber of Commerce was not disclosed publicly until long after his confirmation hearings. A former president of the American College of Trial Lawyers, Powell was widely respected, even by his ideological opponents. But his aggressive expansion of corporate rights was the most consequential development during his tenure on the court. Justice Powell wrote decisions creating the novel concept of “corporate speech,” which he found to be protected by the First Amendment. This doctrine was then used by the court to invalidate numerous laws that were intended to restrain corporate power when it interfered with the public interest. In 1978, for example, Powell wrote the opinion in a 5– 4 decision that for the first time struck down state laws prohibiting corporate money in an election (a citizens referendum in Massachusetts) on the grounds that the law violated the free speech of “corporate persons.” Thirty-two years later, the U.S. Supreme Court relied on Powell’s opinion to allow wealthy individual donors to contribute unlimited amounts to campaigns secretly, and further expanded the 1886 Southern Pacific precedent declaring corporations to be persons. While it is true that corporations are made up of individuals, the absurdity of the legal theory that corporations are “persons”— as defined in the Constitution— is evident from a comparison between the essential nature and motives of corporations compared to those of flesh-and-blood human beings. Most corporations are legally chartered by the state with an ironclad mandate to focus narrowly on the financial interests of their shareholders. They are theoretically immortal and often have access to vast wealth. Twenty-five U.S.-based multinational corporations have revenues larger than many of the world’s nation-states. More than half (53) of the 100 largest economies on Earth are now corporations. ExxonMobil, one of the largest corporations in the world, measured by revenue and profits, has a larger economic impact than the nation of Norway. Individuals are capable of decisions that reflect factors other than their narrow financial self-interest; they are capable of feeling concern about the future their children and grandchildren will inherit— not just the money they will leave them in their wills; America’s founders decided as individuals, for example, to pledge “our Lives, our Fortunes, and our Sacred Honor” to a cause deemed far greater than money. Corporate “persons,” on the other hand, now often seem to have little regard for how they can help the country in which they are based; they are only concerned about how that country can help them make more money. At an oil industry gathering in Washington, D.C., an executive from another company asked the then CEO of Exxon, Lee Raymond, to consider building additional refinery capacity inside the United States “for security” against possible shortages of gasoline. According to those present, Raymond replied, “I’m not a U.S. company and I don’t make decisions based on what’s good for the U.S.” Raymond’s statement recalls the warning by Thomas Jefferson in 1809, barely a month after leaving the White House, when he wrote to John Jay about “the selfish spirit of commerce, which knows no country, and feels no passion or principle but that of gain.” With the emergence of Earth Inc., multinational corporations have also acquired the ability to play nation-states off against one another, locating facilities in jurisdictions with lower wages and less onerous restrictions on their freedom to operate as they wish. The late chairman of the libertarian Cato Institute, William Niskanen, said, “corporations have become sufficiently powerful to pose a threat to governments,” adding that this is “particularly the case with respect to multinational corporations, who will have much less dependence upon the positions of particular governments, much less loyalty in that sense.” In 2001, President George W. Bush was asked by the prime minister of India, Manmohan Singh, to influence ExxonMobil’s pending decision on allowing India’s state-owned oil company to participate in a joint venture including the oil company and the government of Russia. Bush replied, “Nobody tells those guys what to do.” Those who advocate expanding the market sector at the expense of democratic authority believe that governments should rarely have the power to tell corporations “what to do.” For the last forty years, pursuant to the Powell Plan, for several decades— were victims of their own success. As tens of millions were lifted into the middle class, many lost their enthusiasm for continued government interventions, in part because they began to resist the levels of taxation necessary to support a more robust government role in the economy. Labor unions, one of the few organized forces supporting continued reform, lost members as more jobs migrated from manufacturing into services, and as outsourcing and robosourcing hollowed out the U.S. middle class. The nature and sources of America’s economic strength have changed over the last several decades as manufacturing has declined. America’s branch of Earth Inc. can’t be driven solely by wages— investment is of course critical— but the tilt is important, and too little noted. Slowly at first, but then with increasing momentum, the prevailing ideology of the United States— democratic capitalism— has shifted profoundly on its axis. During the decades of conflict with communism, the internal cohesion between the democratic and capitalist spheres was particularly strong. But when communism disappeared as an ideological competitor and democratic capitalism became the ideology of choice throughout most of the world, the internal tensions between the democratic sphere and the capitalist sphere reappeared. As economic globalization accelerated, the imperatives of business were relentlessly pursued by multinational corporations. With triumphalist fervor and the enormous resources made available for a sustained implementation of the Powell Plan, corporate and right-wing forces set about diminishing the role of government in American society and enhancing the power of corporations. Market fundamentalists began to advocate the reallocation of decision-making power from democratic processes to market mechanisms. There were proposals to privatize— and corporatize— schools, prisons, public hospitals, highways, bridges, airports, water and power utilities, police, fire, and emergency services, some military operations, and other basic functions that had been performed by democratically elected governments. By contrast, virtually any proposal that required the exertion of governmental authority— even if it was proposed, debated, designed, and decided in a free democratic process— was often described as a dangerous and despicable step toward totalitarianism. Advocates of policies shaped within the democratic sphere and implemented through the instruments of self-government sometimes found themselves accused of being agents of the discredited ideology that had been triumphantly defeated during the long struggle with communism. The very notion that something called the public interest even existed was derided and attacked as a dangerous concept. By then, the encroachment of big money into the democratic process had convinced many Democrats as well as almost all Republicans to adopt the new ideology that supported the contraction of the democratic sphere and the expansion of the market sphere. It was during this same transition period that television supplanted newspapers as the principal source of information for the majority of voters, and the role of money in political campaigns increased, giving corporate and other special interest donors an even more unhealthy degree of power over the deliberations of the United States Congress and state legislatures. When the decisions of the United States result not from democratic debate but are instead determined by powerful special interests, the results can be devastating to the interests of the American people. Underfunded and poorly designed U.S. social policies have produced a relative decline in the conditions of life. Compared to the other nineteen advanced industrial democracies in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the United States has the highest inequality of incomes and the highest poverty rate; the lowest “material well-being of children” according to the United Nations’ index, the highest child poverty rate and the highest infant mortality rate; the biggest prison population and the highest homicide rate; the biggest expenditures on health care and the largest percentage of its citizens unable to afford health care. At the same time, the success by corporate interests in reducing regulatory oversight created new risks for the U.S. economy. For example, the deregulation of the financial services industry, which accompanied the massive increase in flows of trade and investment throughout the world, led directly to the credit crisis of 2007, which caused the Great Recession (which some economists are now calling “the Second Great Contraction” or “the Lesser Depression”). The international consequences of that spectacular market failure dramatically undermined global confidence in U.S. leadership of economic policy and marked the end of an extraordinary period of U.S. dominance. Nations had generally accepted the so-called Washington Consensus as the best formula for putting their economies on sound footing and building the capacity for sustainable growth. Although most of the policy recommendations contained in the consensus were broadly seen as reflecting sound economic common sense, they tended to expand the market sphere in domestic economies as they removed barriers to global trade and investment flows. Two other factors combined with the 2007– 08 economic crisis to undermine the leadership of the United States: first, the rise of China’s economy, which did not follow the prescriptions of the Washington Consensus even though its success was driven by the uniquely Chinese form of capitalism; second, the catastrophic invasion of Iraq— for reasons that were later proven to be false and dishonest. Within the United States, it is a measure of how distorted the “conversation of democracy” has become that in the aftermath of the economic catastrophe, the most significant “populist” reaction in the U.S. political system was not a progressive demand for protective regulations to prevent a recurrence of what had just happened, but instead a right-wing faux-populist demand by the Tea Party for less government regulation. This movement was financed and hijacked by corporate and right-wing lobbyists who took advantage of the sense of grievance and steered it toward support of an agenda that promoted corporate interests and further diminished the ability of the government to rein in abuses. Extreme partisanship by congressional Tea Party Republicans almost produced a default of the U.S. government in 2011, and threatened to again at the end of 2012. The sudden growth of the Tea Party was also due in significant measure to its promotion by Fox News, which under the ownership of Rupert Murdoch and the leadership of a former media strategist for Richard Nixon— Roger Ailes— has exceeded the wildest dreams of the Powell Plan’s emphasis on changing the nature of American television. Powell had proposed that “The national television networks should be monitored in the same way that textbooks should be kept under constant surveillance.” He called for the creation of “opportunity for supporters of the American system” within the television medium. The inability of American democracy to make difficult decisions is now threatening the nation’s economic future— and with it the ability of the world system to find a pathway forward toward a sustainable future. The exceptionally bitter partisan divide in the United States is nominally between the two major political parties. However, the nature of both Democrats and Republicans has evolved in ways that sharpen the differences between them. On the surface, it appears that Republicans have moved to the right and purged their party of moderates and extinguished the species of liberal Republicans that used to be a significant minority within the party. Democrats, according to this surface analysis, have moved to the left and have largely pushed out moderates and the conservative Democrats who used to play a prominent role in the party. Beneath the surface, however, the changes are far more complex. Both political parties have become so dependent on business lobbies for the large sums of money they must have to purchase television advertisements in order to be reelected that special interest legislation pushed by the industries most active in purchasing influence— financial services, carbon-based energy companies, pharmaceutical companies, and others— can count on large bipartisan majorities. The historic shift of the internal boundary between the overlapping capitalist and democratic spheres that make up America’s reigning ideology, democratic capitalism, has resulted in increased support within both parties for measures that constrain the role of government. This shift has now moved so far to the right that it is not unusual for Democrats to propose ideas that originated with Republicans a few years ago, only to have them summarily rejected as “socialist.” The resulting impasse threatens the future of hugely popular entitlement programs, including Social Security and Medicare, and is heightening partisan divisions on questions considered basic and nonnegotiable on both sides. The tensions have grown more impassioned and bitter than at any point in American history since the decades leading up to the Civil War. “Market fundamentalism” has acquired, in the eyes of its critics, a quasi-religious fervor reminiscent of the zeal that many Marxists displayed before communism failed— although those to whom the label applies feel that liberals and progressives pursue the ideology of “statism” with a single-minded devotion. U.S. self-government is now almost completely dysfunctional, incapable of making important decisions necessary to reclaim control of its destiny. James Madison, one of the most articulate of America’s extraordinary founders, warned in his Federalist No. 10 about the “propensity of mankind to fall into mutual animosities” and cluster into opposing groups, parties, or factions: The latent causes of faction are thus sown in the nature of man; and we see them everywhere brought into different degrees of activity, according to the different circumstances of civil society. A zeal for different opinions concerning religion, concerning government, and many other points, as well of speculation as of practice; an attachment to different leaders ambitiously contending for pre-eminence and power; or to persons of other descriptions whose fortunes have been interesting to the human passions, have, in turn, divided mankind into parties, inflamed them with mutual animosity, and rendered them much more disposed to vex and oppress each other than to co-operate for their common good. Madison noted that this tendency in human nature is so strong that even “the most frivolous and fanciful distinctions have been sufficient to kindle their unfriendly passions and excite their most violent conflicts.” But he went on to highlight the “most common and durable source of factions” as “the various and unequal distribution of property.” The inequality in the distribution of wealth, property, and income in the United States is now larger than at any time since 1929. The outbreak of the Occupy movement has been driven by the dawning awareness of the majority of Americans that the operations of democratic capitalism in its current form are producing unfair and intolerable results. But the weakened state of democratic decision making in the U.S., and the enhanced control over American democracy by the forces of wealth and corporate power, have paralyzed the ability of the country to make rational decisions in favor of policies that would remedy these problems. These two trends, unfortunately, reinforce one another. The more control over democratic decision making by powerful wealthy interests, the more they are able to ensure that decisions on policy enhance their wealth and power. This classic positive feedback loop makes inequality steadily worse, even as it makes democratic solutions for inequality less accessible. The issue of inequality has become a political, ideological, and psychological fault line. Neuroscientists and psychologists have deepened the understanding of political scientists about the true nature of the “left-right” or “liberal-conservative” divide in the politics of every country. Research shows conclusively that these differences are also “sown in the nature of man,” and that in every society there is a basic temperamental divide between those who are relatively more tolerant and others who are relatively less tolerant of inequality. The same divide separates those for whom it is relatively more or relatively less important to care for the weak and victimized, maintain respect for authority— particularly when disorder is threatening— prioritize loyalty to one’s group or nation, demonstrate patriotism, and honor the sanctity of symbols and objects that represent group values. Both groups value liberty and fairness but think about them differently. Recent research indicates that these temperamental differences may be, in part, genetically based, but perhaps more importantly, the differences are reinforced by social feedback loops. The issue of inequality also lies on the ideological fault line between democracy and capitalism. For those who prioritize capitalism, inequality is seen as an obvious and necessary condition for the incentivization of productive activity. If some receive outsized rewards in the marketplace, that is a beneficial outcome not only for those so rewarded but for the capitalist system as a whole, because it demonstrates to others what can happen if they too become more productive. For those who prioritize democracy, the tolerance of persistent inequality is far more likely to stimulate demands for change in the underlying policies that consistently produce unequal outcomes. Inheritance taxes have become a flashpoint in American politics. Why, ask liberals, is there a social value in failing to redistribute some portion of great fortunes when a wealthy person dies? Yet for conservatives, the ability to pass on great wealth at death is just another part of the incentive to earn great wealth in the first place. And they view the imposition of what they call a “death tax” (a label coined by a conservative strategist who conducted deep research on what language would most trigger feelings of outrage) as an encroachment upon their freedom. In my own view, it is absurd to eliminate inheritance taxes; they should be raised instead. The extreme concentration of wealth is destructive to economic vitality and to the health of democracy. Any legislative effort to address inequality with measures that require funding through taxes of any sort has also come to mark the political fault line dividing the United States into two opposing factions. The corporate-led counterreform movement that began in the 1970s adopted as one of its key tenets a cynical strategy known as “starve the beast”; while proclaiming the importance of “balancing the budget” and “reducing deficits,” the movement pushed massive tax cuts as the initial step in a plan to use the resulting funding gap as an excuse to force sharp reductions in the role of government. This was part and parcel of the larger effort to diminish the democracy sphere and enhance the market sphere. What is most troubling to advocates of American democracy is that the radically elevated role of money in politics has given the forces representing wealth and corporate power sufficient strength to advance their agenda even when a sizable majority of the American people oppose it. In effect, those who zealously advocate the expansion of the role of markets while demanding a constriction of the ability of people in democracies to enact policies that address the abuses and disruptive risks that often accompany unrestrained market activity are posing a threat to the internal logic of the nation-state itself. America’s middle class has been hollowed out by, among other causes, the emergence of Earth Inc., the increasing proportion of retired Americans, and advances in the availability of expensive health care technologies. The result is a fast growing financial crisis that is threatening the ability of the United States to provide world leadership. U.S. government indebtedness compared to GDP is threatening to spiral out of control. According to a study by the nonpartisan Congressional Budget Office, the U.S. debt-to-GDP ratio is 70 percent in 2013, and already exceeds GDP if money the government owes to itself is added to the debt. Although a highly publicized credit downgrade by the bond rating firm Standard & Poor’s in 2011 had no perceptible effect on the demand for U.S. bonds, experts have warned that a sudden loss of confidence in the dollar and in the viability of U.S. finances cannot be ruled out in the coming decade. Partly due to the weakness of the euro and a lack of trust in the Chinese yuan, or renminbi (RMB), the U.S. dollar remains the world’s reserve currency. For those and other reasons, the United States is still able to borrow from the rest of the world at extremely low interest rates— as of this writing at less than 2 percent for ten-year bonds. Yet the looming financial troubles are potentially large enough to provoke a sudden loss of confidence in the future of the dollar, and a sudden increase in the interest rates the U.S. government would be required to pay to holders of its debt. Even a one percentage point rise over projected increases in the interest rates paid on the debt would add approximately $ 1 trillion to interest payments over the next decade. The strength of any nation’s economy is, of course, crucial for the exertion of power in multiple ways. It undergirds the ability to finance weapons and armies, and to use foreign aid and trade concessions to build necessary alliances. It enables the building of superior infrastructures and the provision of public goods such as education, job training, public safety, pensions, enforceability of contracts, quality of the legal system, health care, and environmental protection. It also allows for the creation of a superior capacity for research and development, now crucial to gain access to the fruits of the accelerating scientific and technological revolution. More broadly, the ability of any nation to wield power on a sustained basis— whether military, economic, political, or moral— depends upon multiple additional factors, including:        •     Its ability to form intelligent policies and implement them effectively in a timely manner, which usually requires reason-based, transparent decision making and the forging of a domestic consensus in support of policies—policies— particularly if they require a long-term commitment. The Marshall Plan, for example, would not have been possible without bipartisan support in the Congress and the willingness of the American people to commit significant resources to a visionary plan that required decades to implement.        •     The cohesion of its society, which generally requires the perception of fairness in the distribution of incomes and net worth, and a social contract within which real needs are satisfactorily met and governmental power is derived from the genuine consent of the governed. The maintenance of cohesion also requires alertness to and sustained respect for the differing experiences and perspectives of minorities, and a full understanding of the benefits from the absorption of immigrants.        •     The protection of property rights, the enforcement of contracts, and opportunities to invest money without an unreasonable risk of losing wealth.        •     The development and enforcement of sustainable fiscal and monetary policies and bank regulations that minimize the risk of market disruptions and do not accentuate swings in the business cycle. Economic success also requires investments in infrastructure, research and development, and appropriate antitrust enforcement.        •     The development of its human capital with adequate investments in education and job training, health care and mental health care, and nutrition and child care. The Information Revolution has enhanced the importance of investments in human capital, even as it requires a regular updating of appropriate strategies.        •     The protection, conservation, and stewardship of natural capital with environmental protection and energy efficiency. The global climate crisis requires extensive planning for adaptation to the big changes coming, and much greater attention to the need for rapid reductions in global warming pollution. The United States is now failing to satisfy many of these criteria. But it is not the only nation-state that is in danger of dissipating its ability to make sound decisions about the future. The larger and more significant change in the balance of power throughout the world is the relative decline in the effective power of nation-states generally. In the words of Harvard professor Joseph Nye, “the diffusion of power away from government is one of this century’s great political shifts.”

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### Overview

#### Fiat has failed– roleplaying simulates a perfect government charged with nostalgic longing – only new styles of debate away from fiat can help us face the reality of modernity

Lindsey 12 (Dr Jason, PhD from Columbia University and is currently Associate Professor and Chair of Political Science at St. Cloud State University, Baudrillard’s Simulated Politics and Debord’s Agents of Detournement, journal of baud studies vol 9 nmbr 3)

I. Introduction

For the political scientist, Baudrillard's work on simulation and the hyperreal is prescient. Politics in contemporary times seems very hollow when compared to the past. In democratic political systems debates on policy have given way to increasingly baroque ideological arguments. The "issues" that resonate the most with voters are generally symbolic or cultural disputes disconnected from economic management or social welfare. Scholarly evidence for this trend continues to accumulate. A good example is the work Lau and Heldman (2009) which builds on earlier research by Lau in (Sears, Lau, Tyler, and Allen (1980). From this perspective politics, at least in the most developed countries, increasingly resembles Baudrillard's interaction of simulacra.

Before his death, Baudrillard frequently pointed out the ironies of contemporary politics. Consider his statement about the French vote on the EU’s Constitutional treaty in 2005: “The vote is fixed. If the ‘no’ side wins the day this time, they will make us vote again (as in Denmark and Ireland) until the ‘yes’ wins. We may as well vote yes right now” (Baudrillard, 2006). Here there is the sense that this is not what politics and a referendum are, but this is what they have come to be. In most of our political systems we see similar hints that something is not the way it was. What are the tangible differences between left and right wing administrations? Would a left or right government in France handle the EU differently? In the United States, Presidents as vastly different as Obama and Bush dealt with the 2008 economic crisis and its aftermath with a continuity of policies. So when we vote, what are we doing? What are the actual options we are choosing between?

Baudrillard’s perspective fits well with a growing commentary on the emptiness at the heart of contemporary politics. Zizek in his recent (2008) writing on violence points to the curious demands of young rioters in Paris’ banlieus in October 2005. That is, they did not seem to have any demands beyond the spasm of violence in which they engaged. A similar incoherence can be observed at anti globalization protests. People are angry and want to do something about it. However, they seem unable to coherently explain what it is that has them so angry. The spasms of violence that break out on the periphery of any large protest nowadays also points to a frustration with current politics. Most recently, we have seen the Occupy Wall Street protests successfully capture the attention of a very large audience. However, these protests failed to articulate a coherent political program. In his visit to the group camped out in New York, Zizek pointed out this shortcoming when he was invited to speak. As he put it, “We know what we do not want. But what do we want?” (Zizek, 2011).

If there are no substantive policy differences between parties anymore, then, as Baudrillard would expect, we have to invent some. Witness the entire pop culture industry in the United States devoted to the mythology of Conservatives and Liberals. This industry now embraces books, television, radio, and the Internet, as well as satirical greeting cards in either flavor. Here again is the sense that these examples are not real politics. Instead, we have cultural products that seem to be the very definition of Baudrillard’s simulacra. But how do we know this?

If all politics is just being played out within the hyperreal, that is, politics are just combinations of signs and simulacra, then why do we have a sense that this is not “real” politics? Why do referendums seem so empty to us? Why are we able to organize protests, but then have the sense that we failed to define a “real” concrete program? Furthermore are signs and simulacra powerful enough to inspire individuals to the point of political violence? Baudrillard would most likely argue that violence on the periphery of politics is not inspired by the interaction of simulacra. Instead, this violence represents a frustration and impatience with politics. For Baudrillard, the possibility of a contemporary, active politics is very slim. Thus, we should expect to see indifference or frustration. However, if that is the case, then how do we explain the motivation of some individuals for engaging in this empty politics to the point of extremism?

To explain this tension, we should examine evidence of a politics capable of referencing something outside of other simulacra. A good pressure point for such an analysis is contemporary use of the modern political tactic of detournement as described by Debord and the situationists. Despite evidence for Baudrillard’s analysis of politics as simulation, the modern political tactic of detournement is still effective. If this is the case, then how can this be explained within Baudrillard’s larger analysis of our contemporary situation?

II. Simulations and Detournement

Recently, a colleague expressed some frustration to me when trying to talk to his students about Che Guevera. Although the students recognized his image, they had no clear idea who Che was. As Baudrillard and others would expect, they knew the image of Che from our consumer culture, but could not articulate who he was. Yet, they still knew his image was associated with subversive activities and radical politics.

This sort of incident illustrates an important point about images; they are double edged. Since the image can be disconnected from its initial context, we have the possibility of DeBord and the Situationists' detournement. We can recycle and re cut the image (like the "culture jamming" of the Ad Busters) to create new messages [culture-jamming] that are communicable through the cultural terrain (see www.adbusters.org). On the other hand, given Baudrillard’s description of our contemporary situation, how plausible is detournement since images are indeed detached? More concretely, how far removed can a given image be before it has lost both its "official" meaning and its reprogrammed "subversive" one? Does this problem indicate that we must consider the timing of detournement activities? Must we create the subversive use of the image while there is still a consciousness of the image's original intent?

Furthermore, if there is an element of timing necessary for detournement, then we must consider the following sort of analysis. Why are some images more deeply ingrained with their initial intent? In turn, such deeper images may retain a possible subversive or detournement meaning for a longer period as well. If some images can be used for a longer period, then does this challenge Baudrillard's assertions that there is no meaning left beyond simulation? If there is no meaning behind the image, then why are some still useable in both "official" and "subversive" modes for a much longer period than others?

Does the possibility of detournement mean that there is some truth to our sense of contemporary politics being a simulation of "real politics”? The ability of detournement to expose the real meaning behind advertising and other public statements suggests that we still possess an ability to understand the authentic when we see it. How else can one explain detournement's continuing effectiveness?

Baudrillard indicates in his work Simulations that this is the wrong question to ask. According to Baudrillard: "We are witnessing the end of perspective and panoptic space (which remains a moral hypothesis bound up with every classical analysis of the 'objective' essence of power), and hence the very abolition of the spectacular” (Baudrillard, 1983:54). Thus, Baudrillard thought that we had already entered (in the 1980's) a period later than the society of the spectacle that Debord describes in the 1960's. The idea of any remaining ground or foundation from which one could engage in Debord's neo Marxist analysis has already disappeared according to Baudrillard.

From this perspective, there is no relationship or channel of manipulation to unmask. The relationship between media and us (the audience) has collapsed to the point that Baudrillard sees no space between the two. In, Simulations, Baudrillard speaks explicitly about television (Ibid.:55-58). Already in 1983 he is concerned that reality television meant that there was no longer a subject with perspective. So, to Baudrillard, Debord's analysis is already obsolete because we are no longer an audience to a spectacle but instead we are a part of simulation. Thus for Baudrillard, the real has been replaced by the hyperreal.

However, if Baudrillard is correct, then shouldn't detournement become ineffective? If the distance needed for a relationship like Debord's spectacle has collapsed, then how could the dialectic of recuperation and detournement still be possible? For Baudrillard the answer would appear to be that Debord's concept is impossible. Anything that appears to us now as detournement is most likely a simulation of that process. Recuperation and detournement are collapsed categories just like every other possible anchor in the hyperreal. Indeed, Baudrillard seems borne out to some extent when we consider the efforts of companies and products to establish "street cred". These efforts range from advertising that engages in self-parody to the planting of grass roots reviews on websites. Thus, the idea of detournement, or perhaps we should say authentic, non-simulated detournement seems obsolete.

Debord himself indicates that detournement relies on some sort of ground or context. Hence, his second law of detournement, "The distortions introduced in the detourned elements must be as simplified as possible, since the main impact of detournement is directly related to the conscious or semiconscious recollection of the original contexts of the elements" (Debord and Wolman [1956] 2006). If Baudrillard is correct in his description of the hyperreal, then it is hard to see how this original context can survive.

Yet, despite Baudrillard's criticism, there is evidence of Debord's dialectic functioning in contemporary culture. Writing in the late 1950's, Debord and Wolman argued that a growth in detournement would become visible in the arts through, "an increasingly extensive transformation of phrases or plastic works that happen to be in fashion" (Ibid.:3). This observation triggers several associations with contemporary culture such as the pervasive sampling that makes up current music, books that stitch together different cultural worlds, (such as Pride and Prejudice and Zombies) or television sitcoms such as The Office, which styles itself like a reality program. Furthermore, some images and pieces of culture retain enough meaning that they can easily be turned into a "subversive" mode. How is this possible unless there remains enough relationship and connection to areas outside of simulation?

Perhaps Baudrillard could argue that these acts of resistance are simply wheels within wheels. The evidence we see of Debord's dialectic is simply the dramatic narrative of the simulation we know. With this interpretation, the hyperreal can retain the dramatic elements and themes of an earlier time, even though this is now unhinged from meaning. However, this solipsistic position ignores much evidence from contemporary culture.

For example, we can see the dynamic of Debord's detournement and recuperation at work in several areas of contemporary, popular culture. Consider these recent manifestations of cultural recuperation: Motorcycles and motorcycle gang style- now co-opted into brand named superstores; punk rock and punk rock music- co-opted in the 1990's through grunge and alternative labels; or Goth subculture- co-opted both in popular television and movies and mainstream cosmetics that now feature Goth style colors in lipstick etc. Thus Debord's dynamic of detournement and recuperation seems to still be going strong.

Two intertwining poles of agency explain this dynamic’s motive force. The first pole (or it could be the second) of this dynamo are strategic, market calculations (recuperation revives failing street cred and hence sales). The second pole (though we might prefer that it be the first), are artistic imperatives (detournement carves out a space for creativity and, hence, originality). Yet, where is such agency to be found in Baudrillard's view?

In Baudrillard's broader work the simulacra he describes appear to feed off of each other. Yet this view seems sorely lacking in human agency. In a classic, broad reflection on perception and memory Bergson states, "The function of the body is not to store up recollections, but simply to choose, in order to bring back to consciousness, by the real efficacy thus conferred on it, the useful memory, that which may complete and illuminate the present situation with a view to ultimate action" (Bergson, 1991:179). Indeed, if the goal of an actor within Debord's dialectic is action, then she chooses some images and symbols with purpose. This dimension of strategy and tactics is missing from Baudrillard's analysis because it is, again to him, the wrong perspective. In contrast, detournement is at its core for Debord, a tool or tactic of class struggle and for defeating the remains of modernism in the arts. Such a program or cause is obsolete to Baudrillard given his view of our contemporary situation.

Another way to pose this difference between the two thinkers is to compare Debord's idea of the "spectacle" to Baudrillard's idea of "the system of objects". The chapter on advertising in Baudrillard's The System of Objects, brings out an important distinction between Baudrillard and Debord (Baudrillard, [1968] 1996:164-196). The discussion develops into an exploration of the mass psychology of advertising. Baudrillard argues that the rational claims made in advertising are not really believed by any of us. Instead, they provide a rationalization for purchases that we desire due to non-rational motivations. Baudrillard sees advertising as a surface phenomenon of the system of objects that we live within. The key difference between Baudrillard's description of this vast economic, political, and ideological system of consumption from Debord turns upon agency.

Debord still sees the spectacle as a force that can be countered with tactics such as detournement. In contrast, Baudrillard sees the system of objects as a more pervasive whole into which we are psychologically integrated. The idea of individual agency leading to some sort of resistance begins to look in Baudrillard's conception like the rebelliousness of a child, rather than the acts of Debord's class conflict.

So, where has this discussion taken us in thinking about politics and the simulation of politics? Debord and Wolman argue under the second law of detournement that it indeed requires a context but that this is, "only a particular case of a general law that governs not only detournement but also any other form of action in the world. The idea of pure absolute expression is dead" (Debord and Wolman [1956] 2006). Thus, for Debord this context can be as mythical, metaphysical, or ideological as its audience is capable of comprehending.

Signs and simulacra in such a context suggest the stage of “sorcery” within Baudrillard's precession of simulacra. Could this be a good way of thinking about contemporary politics as a closed system of obscurantist meanings? From this perspective, detournement could still be alive in pockets of the hyperreal where individuals still participate within a bounded envelope of ideology. Within this context signs can profoundly refer to other signs for the initiated.

On the other hand, how believable is the idea that contemporary politics is an obscurantist system for the initiated, since politics involves mass behavior? Can such a view explain the agency and motivation we still encounter among political entrepreneurs that emerge from the grassroots? How can we explain the efforts at detournement we still see in society from below, as well as successful examples of recuperation?

III. Baudrillard, Debord, and Nostalgia

A possible path of reconciliation between these two positions is to consider Baudrillard's discussion of nostalgia. Baudrillard discusses in several of his later writings the prevalence for nostalgia in contemporary culture. Furthermore, our recent visions of the future seem to be ones where individuals are looking back upon us. The most obvious versions of this nostalgia for Baudrillard are books and films where, in a post apocalyptic setting; the survivors walk around the debris of our contemporary world.

In this sense there is a context in Baudrillard when he examines contemporary ideas of the future. The odd nostalgia he describes comes from us, human agents, trying to imagine the outcome of our contemporary actions. From this perspective, our unease is not due to the style or practice of contemporary politics, but to an underlying intuition about the failure of politics. Contemporary humanity faces the possibility of catastrophic risk. The shadow of ecological disaster is especially present in the minds of most of us.

Nostalgia then is something we feel for what politics was. Perhaps detournement continues to work because many of us long for modern (as opposed to contemporary) politics with its clarity of class conflict and ideologies that revolved around the role of the free market. Thus, we still respond to detournement actions that reference this earlier context. Furthermore, many of us prefer to still practice and participate in politics bounded by this context.

Yet, we suspect that this is simulation, not because it is "unreal" but because politics in this sense does not address the most urgent issues that should be political. Instead, with our politics locked into this modern context, the urgent issues of climate change, pollution, technological risk, and mass scale terrorism become topics for culture. Thus, we see the nostalgia for the "society that was", our current one, in literature and film with post apocalyptic themes.

Nostalgia is also a defense or a coping mechanism. What agency do any of us possess within our contemporary context? Because we sense the futility of politics, as we know it within this contemporary setting, we retreat to behaving as if the old context, with its familiar categories and practices, still exists. Because we behave this way, it does continue to exist but at a cost. We soldier on within a modern politics that is increasingly detached from the constraints (ecological, economic, and biological) of our existence. This closed system of modern politics goes on in a ritualistic fashion, despite our growing frustration, and awareness, of its inability to address our common problems.

Recent commentary that criticizes the whole idea of detournement and Baudrillard’s analysis reflects this desire for politics as it was. In their book, Nation of Rebels, Heath and Potter argue that Baudrillard and Debord have created a closed ideology (Heath and Potter, 2004). From this critical perspective, they argue that there is no system performing recuperation. Instead, by collapsing the categories of the political and the cultural, many on the left have fallen into a bottomless trap. They continue to try and create a counterculture that simply sells more lifestyle product, while failing to attend to “real” politics. Real politics being the incremental policy changes that create results as in the past.

Is this a devastating critique? Or is this nostalgia for the politics that was? The examples Heath and Potter give of positive change, the American Civil Rights Movement, the construction of the welfare state, seem like a museum to us now. Is the context for such political activity still with us? Do we live in an era capable of producing such outcomes?

Instead, politics in this sort of analysis begins to resemble religion in that we appeal to it and diligently perform our duties waiting for an intervention that does not come. Have we not performed our roles earnestly enough? Are we neglecting the rites of our fathers? Do we need to switch to another denomination? Should we blame the clergy? And of course some of us begin to have our doubts that any of it matters.

From this perspective, the post apocalyptic nostalgia so prevalent in contemporary culture voices our lurking fears. In these movies and books, our lurking suspicion that contemporary politics fails to address the "real problem" is realized. This is also a reconciliation of Baudrillard and Debord. Detournement still works because we can access this past context. Indeed, we continue to blindly insist that this past social context is still our contemporary home. When our contemporary attempts at politics flounder, because they must confront a very different world today, we try to evaluate their efficacy with this rubric from the past. Why are our governments unable to address the looming ecological crisis? Why don’t our political parties provide us with a range of public policies to choose from?

What do these observations mean for thinking about politics? If Baudrillard and Debord are both accurate in their descriptions, then we seem to be in a moment of political stagnation. The tactics of Debord's detournement remain relevant because we continue to look backward to what politics were. These tactics are successful on one larger point, they temporarily expose our contemporary politics as a simulation of the modern form of politics that was. In this sense, practicing Debord's detournement is a useful activity, but only a first step leading to our contemporary time's pervasive nostalgia. The next step, taking Baudrillard's diagnosis seriously, and developing new forms of politics for our contemporary situation, is a greater challenge (see also Lindsey 2007).

#### This is a question of priorities---their reliance on the state actively promotes racist domestic warfare and the prison industrial complex---prefer the alt which allows for more creative, dynamic forms of activism AGAINST THE STATE---the pedagogical nature of the activity matters

Rodriguez 8 (Dylan, Associate Professor at Un iversity of Califo r n i a Riverside, Warfare and the Terms of Engagement, libcom.org/files/Critical Resistance - Abolition Now! Ten Years of Strategy and Struggle against the Prison Industrial Complex.pdf

This introductory litany of dread reminds us that domestic warfare is both the common language and intensely materialized modality of the US state. While this form of legitimated state violence certainly predates Reagan's "war on drugs" and his/its inheritors, the scope and depth of domestic warmaking seems to be mount­ ing with a peculiar urgency in our historical moment. To take former NYPD and current LAPD Chief William Bratton on the strength of his own words, the pri­ mary work of the police is to engage aggressively in "the internal war on terrorism," which in these times entails everything from record-breaking expansions of urban police forces, to cross-party consensus in legislating state offensives against crimi- 92 nalized populations o f choice, and the reshuffling of administrative relationships between the militarized and juridical arms of local and federal government to fa­ cilitate the state's various localized "wars on gangs." It is in this context that we can urgently assume the political burden of critically assessing the work of progressive US based community and non-profit organizations, grassroots movements, and is­ sue-based campaigns: that is, if we are to take the state's own language of domestic warfare seriously, what do we make of the political, ideological, institutional, and financial relationships that progressive movements, campaigns, and organizations are creating in (uneasy) alliance with the state's vast architectures of war? Under what conditions and sets of assumptions are progressive activists, organizers, and scholars able to so militantly oppose the proliferation of American state violence in other parts of the world, while tolerating the everyday state violence of US policing, criminal law, and low-intensity genocide?

We are collectively witnessing, surviving, and working in a time of unprec­ edented state-organized human capture and state-produced physical/social/ psychic alienation, from the 2.5 million imprisoned by the domestic and global US prison industrial complex to the profound forms of informal apartheid and proto­ apartheid that are being instantiated in cities, suburbs, and rural areas all over the country. This condition presents a profound crisis-and political possibility-for people struggling against the white supremacist state, which continues to institution­ alize the social liquidation and physical evisceration of Black, brown, and aboriginal peoples nearby and far away. If we are to approach racism, neoliberalism, mili­ tarism/militarization, and US state hegemony and domination in a legitimately "global" way, it is nothing short of unconscionable to expend significant politi­ cal energy protesting American wars elsewhere (e.g. Iraq, Afghanistan, etc.) when there are overlapping, and no less profoundly oppressive, declarations of and mobilizations for war in our very own, most intimate and nearby geographies of "home."

This time of crisis and emergency necessitates a critical examination of the po­ litical and institutional logics that structure so much of the US progressive left, and particularly the "establishment" left that is tethered (for better and worse) to the non-profit industrial complex (NPIC). I have defined the NPIC elsewhere as the set of symbiotic relationships that link political and financial technologies of state and owning class social control with surveillance over public political discourse, including and especially emergent progressive and leftist social movements. This definition is most focused on the industrialized incorporation, accelerated since the 1970s, of pro-state liberal and progressive campaigns and movements into a spec­ trum of government-proctored non-profit organizations. It i s i n the context o f the formation o f the NPIC a s a political power structure that I wish to address, with a less-than-subtle sense of alarm, a peculiar and dis­ turbing politics of assumption that often structures, disciplines, and actively shapes the work of even the most progressive movements and organizations within the US establishment left (of which I too am a part, for better and worse): that is, the left's willingness to fundamentally tolerate-and accompanying unwillingness to abolish-the institutionalized dehumanization of the contemporary policing and imprisonment apparatus in its most localized, unremarkable, and hence "normal" manifestations within the domestic "homeland" of the Homeland Security state. Behind the din of progressive and liberal reformist struggles over public policy, civil liberties, and law, and beneath the infrequent mobilizations of activity to defend against the next onslaught of racist, classist, ageist, and misogynist crimi­ nalization, there is an unspoken politics of assumption that takes for granted the mystified permanence of domestic warfare as a constant production of targeted and massive suffering, guided by the logic of Black, brown, and indigenous subjection to the expediencies and essential violence of the American (global) nation-building proj ect. To put it differently: despite the unprecedented forms of imprisonment, so­ cial and political repression, and violent policing that compose the mosaic of our historical time, the establishment left (within and perhaps beyond the US) does not care to envision, much less politically prioritize, the abolition of US domestic warfare and its structuring white supremacist social logic as its most urgent task of the present and future. Our non-profit left, in particular, seems content to en­ bdgt ill Jesperate (and usually well-intentioned) attempts to manage the casualties of domestic warfare, foregoing the urgency of an abolitionist praxis that openly, critically, and radically addresses the moral, cultural, and political premises of these wars.

Not long from now, generations will emerge from the organic accumulation of rage, suffering, social alienation, and (we hope) politically principled rebellion against this living apocalypse and pose to us some rudimentary questions of radical accountability: How were we able to accommodate, and even culturally and politi­ cally normalize the strategic, explicit, and openly racist technologies of state violence that effectively socially neutralized and frequently liquidated entire nearby populations of our people, given that ours are the very same populations that have historically struggled to survive and overthrow such "classical" structures of domi­ nance as colonialism, frontier conquest, racial slavery, and other genocides? In a somewhat more intimate sense, how could we live with ourselves in this domestic state of emergency, and why did we seem to generally forfeit the creative possibilities of radically challenging, dislodging, and transforming the ideological and institutional premises o f this condition o f domestic warfare i n favor o f short-term, "winnable" policy reforms? (For example, why did we choose to formulate and tol­ erate a "progressive" political language that reinforced dominant racist notions of "criminality" in the process of trying to discredit the legal basis of "Three Strikes" laws?) What were the fundamental concerns of our progressive organizations and movements during this time, and were they willing to comprehend and galvanize an effective, or even viable opposition to the white supremacist state's terms of en­ gagement (that is, warfare)? This radical accountability reflects a variation on anti­ colonial liberation theorist Frantz Fanon's memorable statement to his own peers, comrades, and nemeses:

Each generation must discover its mission, fulfill it or betray it, in relative opac­ ity. In the underdeveloped countries preceding generations have simultaneously resisted the insidious agenda of colonialism and paved the way for the emergence of the current struggles. Now that we are in the heat of combat, we must shed the habit of decrying the efforts of our forefathers or feigning incomprehension at their silence or passiveness.

Lest we fall victim to a certain political nostalgia that is often induced by such illuminating Fanonist exhortations, we ought to clarify the premises of the social "mission" that our generation of US based progressive organizing has undertaken. In the vicinity of the constantly retrenching social welfare apparatuses of the US state, much of the most urgent and immediate work of community-based or­ ganizing has revolved around service provision. Importantly, this pragmatic focus also builds a certain progressive ethic of voluntarism that constructs the model ac­ tivist as a variation on older liberal notions of the "good citizen." Following Fanon, the question is whether and how this mission ought to be fulfilled or betrayed. I believe that to respond to this political problem requires an analysis and conceptu­ alization of "the state" that is far more complex and laborious than we usually allow in our ordinary rush of obligations to build campaigns, organize communities, and write grant proposals. In fact, I think one pragmatic step toward an abolitionist politics involves the development of grassroots pedagogies (such as reading groups, in-home workshops, inter-organization and inter-movement critical dialogues) that will compel us to teach ourselves about the different ways that the state works in the context of domestic warfare, so that we no longer treat it simplistically. We require, in other words, a scholarly activist framework to understand that the state can and must be radically confronted on multiple fronts by an abolition ist politics.

In so many ways, the US progressive/left establishment is filling the void created by what Ruthie Gilmore has called the violent "abandonments" of the state, which forfeits and implodes its own social welfare capacities (which were already insuf­ ficient at best) while transforming and (productively) exploding its domestic war­ making functionalities (guided by a " frightening willingness to engage in human sacrifice"). Yet, at the same time that the state has been openly galvanizing itself to declare and wage violent struggle against strategically targeted local populations, the establishment left remains relatively unwilling and therefore institutionally un­ able to address the questions of social survival, grassroots mobilization, radical so­ cial justice, and social transformation on the concrete and everyday terms of the very domestic wares) that the state has so openly and repeatedly declared as the premises of its own coherence.

P I T FA L L S O F T H E P E DAG O G I CA L STATE

We can broadly understand that "the state" is in many ways a conceptual term that refers to a mind-boggling array of geographic, political, and institutional relations of power and domination. It is, in that sense, a term of abstraction: certainly the state is "real," but it is so massive and institutionally stretched that it simply can­ not be understood and "seen" in its totality. The way we come to comprehend the state's realness-or differently put, the way the state makes itself comprehensible, intelligible, and materially identifiable to ordinary people-is through its own self­ narrations and institutional mobilizations.

Consider the narrative and institutional dimensions of the "war on drugs," for nample. New Y ork City mayor Edward Koch, in a gesture of masculine challenge to the Reagan-era Feds, offers a prime example of such a narration in a 1986 op-ed piece published on the widely-read pages of The New York Times: I propose the following steps as a coordinated Federal response to [the war on drugs]: Use the full resources of the military for drug interdiction. The Posse Comitatus doctrine, which restricts participation of the military in civilian law enforce­ ment, must be modified so that the military can be used for narcotics control . . . Enact a Federal death penalty for drug wholesalers. Life sentences, harsh fines, forfeitures of assets, billions spent on education and therapy all have failed to deter the drug wholesaler. The death penalty would. Capital punishment is an extraordinary remedy, but we are facing an extraordinary peril . . . Designate United States narcotics prisons. The Bureau of Prisons should des­ ignate separate facilities for drug offenders. Segregating such prisoners from others, preferably i n remote locations such a s the Yukon or desert areas, might motivate drug offenders to abandon their trade. Enhance the Federal agencies combating the drug problem. The Attorney Gen­ eral should greatly increase the number of drug enforcement agents in New York and other cities. He should direct the Federal Bureau of Investigation to devote substantial manpower against the cocaine trade and should see to it that the Immigration and Naturalization Service is capable of detecting and deporting aliens convicted of drug crimes in far better numbers than it now does. Enact the state and local narcotics control assistance act of 1986. This bill provides $750 million annually for five years to assist state and local jurisdictions increase their capacities for enforcement, corrections, education and prosecution.

These proposals offer no certainty for success in the fight against drugs, of course. If we are to succeed, however, it is essential that we persuade the Federal Government to recognize its responsibility to lead the way. Edward Koch's manifesto reflects an important dimension of the broader in­ stitutional, cultural, and political activities that build the state as a mechanism of self-legitimating violence: the state (here momentarily manifest in the person of the New York City Mayor) constantly tells stories about itself, facilitated by a politi­ cally willing and accomplice corporate media.

This storytelling-which through repetition and saturation assembles the pop­ ular "common sense" of domestic warfare-is inseparable from the on-the-ground shifting, rearranging, and recommitting of resources and institutional power that we witness in the everyday mobilizations of a state waging intense, localized, mili­ tarized struggle against its declared internal enemies. Consider, for example, how pronouncements like those of Koch, Reagan, and Bratton seem to always be ac­ companied by the operational innovation of different varieties of covert ops, urban guerilla war, and counterintelligence warfare that specifically emerge through the state's declared domestic wars on crime/drugs/gangs/etc. Hence, it is no coincidence that Mayor Koch's editorial makes the stunning appeal to withdraw ("modify") the Posse Comitatus principle, to allow the Federal government's formal mobilization of its global war apparatus for battle in the homeland neighborhoods of the war on drugs. To reference our example even more closely, we can begin to see how the ramped-up policing and massive imprisonment of Black and Latino youth in Koch's 1980s New York were enabled and normalized by his and others' attempts to story tell the legal empowerment and cultural valorization of the police, such that the nuts-and-bolts operation of the prison industrial complex was lubricated by the multiple moral parables of domestic warfare.

This process of producing the state as an active, tangible, and identifiable structure of power and dominance, through the work of self-narration and con­ crete mobilizations of institutional capacity, is what some scholars call "statecraft." Generally, the state materializes and becomes comprehensible to us through these definitive moments of crafting: that is, we come to identify the state as a series of active political and institutional projects. So, if the state's self-narration inundates us with depictions of its policing and juridical arms as the righteously punitive and justifiably violent front lines of an overlapping series of comprehensive, militarized, and culturally valorized domestic wars-for my generation, the "war on drugs," the generation prior, the "war on crime," and the current generation, localized "wars on gangs" and their planetary rearticulation in the "war on terror"-then it is the ma­ terial processes of war, from the writing of public policy to the hyper-weaponiza­ tion of the police, that commonly represents the existence of the state as we come to normally "know" it.

Given that domestic warfare composes both the common narrative language and concrete material production of the state, the question remains as to why the establishment left has not confronted this statecraft with the degree of absolute emergency that the condition implies (war!). Perhaps it is because we are under­ estimating the skill and reach of the state as a pedagogical (teaching) apparatus, replete with room for contradiction and relatively sanctioned spaces for " dissent" and counter-state organizing. Italian political prisoner Antonio Gramsci's thoughts on the formation of the contemporary pedagogical state are instructive here: The State does have and request consent, but it also "educates" this consent, by means of the political and syndical associations; these, however, are private organisms, left to the private initiative of the ruling class.

Although Gramsci was writing these words in the early 1900s, he had already iden­ tified the institutional symbiosis that would eventually produce the non-profit in­ dustrial complex. The historical record of the last three decades shows that liberal foundations such as the Ford, Mellon, Rockefeller, Soros and other financial entities have become politically central to "the private initiative of the ruling class" and have in fact funded a breath-taking number of organizations, grassroots campaigns, and progressive political interests. The questions I wish to insert here, however, are whether the financially enabling gestures of foundations also 1) exert a politically disciplinary or repressive force on contemporary social movements and community based organizations, while 2) nurturing an ideological and structural allegiance to the state that preempts a more creative, radical, abolitionist politics.

Several social movement scholars have argued that the "channeling mecha­ nisms" of the non-profit industrial complex "may now far outweigh the effect of direct social control by states in explaining the . . . orthodox tactics, and moderate goals of much collective action in modern America." The non-profit apparatus and its symbiotic relationship to the state amount to a sophisticated technology of po­ litical repression and social control, accompanying and facilitating the ideological and institutional mobilizations of a domestic war waging state. Avowedly pro­ gressive, radical, leftist, and even some misnamed "revolutionary" groups find it opportune to assimilate into this state-sanctioned organizational paradigm, as it simultaneously allows them to establish a relatively stable financial and operational infrastructure while avoiding the transience, messiness, and possible legal compli­ cation of working under decentralized, informal, or even "underground" auspices. Thus, the aforementioned authors suggest that the emergence of the state-proc­ tored non-profit industry "suggests a historical movement away from direct, crud­ er forms [of state repression], toward more subtle forms of state social control of social movements."

The regularity with which progressive organizations immediately forfeit the crucial political and conceptual possibilities of abolishing domestic warfare is a direct reflection of the extent to which domestic war has been fashioned into the everyday, "normal" reality of the state. By extension, the non-profit industrial complex, which is fundamentally guided by the logic of being state-sanctioned (and often state-funded), also reflects this common reality: the operative assumptions of domestic warfare are taken for granted because they form and inform the popu­ lar consensus.

Effectively contradicting, decentering, and transforming the popular consensus (for example, destabiliZing assertive assumptions common to progressive move­ ments and organizations such as "we have to control/get rid of gangs," "we need prisons," or "we want better police") is, in this context, dangerously difficult work. Although, the truth of the matter is that the establishment US left, in ways both spoken and presumed, may actually agree with the political, moral, and ideological premises of domestic warfare. Leaders as well as rank-and-file members in avowedly progressive organizations can and must reflect on how they might actually be supporting and reproducing existing forms of racism, white supremacy, state violence, and domestic warfare in the process of throwing their resources behind what they perceive as "winnable victories," in the lexicon of venerable community organizer Saul Alinsky. Our historical moment suggests the need for a principled political rupturing of existing techniques and strategies that fetishize and fixate on the negotiation, massaging, and management of the worst outcomes of domestic warfare. One po­ litical move long overdue is toward grassroots pedagogies of radical dis-identification with the state, in the trajectory of an anti-nationalism or anti-patriotism, that reorients a progressive identification with the creative possibilities of insurgency (this is to consider "insurgency" as a politics that pushes beyond the defensive ma­ neuvering of "resistance"). Reading a few a few lines down from our first invoking of Fanon's call to collective, liberatory action is clarifying here: "For us who are de­ termined to break the back of colonialism, our historic mission is to authorize every revolt, every desperate act, and every attack aborted or drowned in blood." While there are rare groups in existence that offer this kind of nourishing polit­ ical space (from the L.A.-based Youth Justice Coalition to the national organization INCITE! Women of Color Against Violence), they are often forced to expend far too much energy challenging both the parochialisms of the hegemonic non-profit apparatus and the sometimes narrow politics of the progressive US left.

I have become somewhat obsessed with amplifying the need for a dramatic, even spectacular political shift that pushes against and reaches beyond the implicit pro­ state politics of left progressivism. Most importantly, I am convinced that the aboli­ tion ot domestic warfare, not unlike precedent (and ongoing) struggles to abolish colonialism, slavery, and programmatic genocide, necessitates a rigorous theoreti­ cal and pragmatic approach to a counter- and anti-state radicalism that attempts to fracture the foundations of the existing US social form-because after all, there is truly nothing to be redeemed of a society produced through such terror-inspiring structures of dominance. lhis political shift requires a sustained labor of radical vision, and in the most crucial ways is actually anchored to "progressive" notions of life, freedom, community, and collective/personal security (including safety from racist policing/criminalization and the most localized brutalities of neoliberal or global capitalism).

Arguably, it is precisely the creative and pragmatic work of political fantasy/ political vision/political imagination that is the most underdeveloped dimension of the US establishment left's organizational modus operandi and public discourse. While a full discussion is best left for another essay, we might consider the post- 1960s history of the reactionary, neoconservative, and Christian fundamentalist US right, which has fully and eagerly engaged in these political labors of fantasy/vi-sionlimagination, and has seen the desires of their wildest dreams met o r exceeded in their struggles for political and cultural hegemony. It might be useful to begin by thinking of ourselves as existing in a relationship of deep historical obligation to the long and recent, faraway and nearby historical legacies of radical, revolutionary, and liberationist struggles that have made the abolition of oppressive violence their most immediate and fundamental political desire.

### AT Perm

#### Role-playing causes passivity, tyranny and denies value to life

Antonio ‘95 (Robert, University of Kansas, Nietzsche's Antisociology: Subjectified Culture and the End of History American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 101, No. 1 (Jul., 1995), pp. 1-43, AM)\*We don’t endorse gendered language

The "problem of the actor," Nietzsche said, "troubled me for the longest time."'12 He considered "roles" as "external," "surface," or "foreground" phenomena and viewed close personal identification with them as symptomatic of estrangement. While modern theorists saw dif- ferentiated roles and professions as a matrix of autonomy and reflexivity, Nietzsche held that persons (especially male professionals) in specialized occupations overidentify with their positions and engage in gross fabrica- tions to obtain advancement. They look hesitantly to the opinion of oth- ers, asking themselves, "How ought I feel about this?" **They are so thoroughly absorbed in simulating effective role players that they have trouble being anything but actors**-"The role has actually become the character." **This highly subjectified social self or simulator suffers devas- tating inauthenticity.** The powerful authority given the social greatly amplifies Socratic culture's already self-indulgent "inwardness." Integ- rity, decisiveness, spontaneity, and pleasure are undone by paralyzing overconcern about possible causes, meanings, and consequences of acts and unending internal dialogue about what others might think, expect, say, or do (Nietzsche 1983, pp. 83-86; 1986, pp. 39-40; 1974, pp. 302-4, 316-17). **Nervous rotation of socially appropriate "masks" reduces persons to hypostatized "shadows," "abstracts," or simulacra.** One adopts "many roles," playing them "badly and superficially" in the fashion of a stiff "puppet play." Nietzsche asked, "Are you genuine? Or only an actor? A representative or that which is represented? . . . [Or] no more than an imitation of an actor?" Simulation is so pervasive that it is hard to tell the copy from the genuine article; social selves "prefer the copies to the originals" (Nietzsche 1983, pp. 84-86; 1986, p. 136; 1974, pp. 232- 33, 259; 1969b, pp. 268, 300, 302; 1968a, pp. 26-27). Their inwardness and aleatory scripts foreclose genuine attachment to others. This type of actor cannot plan for the long term or participate in enduring net- works of interdependence; such a person is neither willing nor able to be a "stone" in the societal "edifice" (Nietzsche 1974, pp. 302-4; 1986a, pp. 93-94). Superficiality rules in the arid subjectivized landscape. Neitzsche (1974, p. 259) stated, "One thinks with a watch in one's hand, even as one eats one's midday meal while reading the latest news of the stock market; one lives as if one always 'might miss out on something. ''Rather do anything than nothing': this principle, too, is merely a string to throttle all culture. . . . Living in a constant chase after gain compels people to expend their spirit to the point of exhaustion in continual pretense and overreaching and anticipating others." Pervasive leveling, improvising, and faking foster an inflated sense of ability and an oblivious attitude about the fortuitous circumstances that contribute to role attainment (e.g., class or ethnicity). The most medio- cre people believe they can fill any position, even cultural leadership. Nietzsche respected the self-mastery of genuine ascetic priests, like Socra- tes, and praised their ability to redirect ressentiment creatively and to render the "sick" harmless. But he deeply feared the new simulated versions. Lacking the "born physician's" capacities, these impostors am- plify the worst inclinations of the herd; they are "violent, envious, ex- ploitative, scheming, fawning, cringing, arrogant, all according to cir- cumstances. " Social selves are fodder for the "great man of the masses." Nietzsche held that "the less one knows how to command, the more ur- gently one covets someone who commands, who commands severely- a god, prince, class, physician, father confessor, dogma, or party conscience. The deadly combination of desperate conforming and overreaching and untrammeled ressentiment **paves the way for a new type of tyrant** (Nietzsche 1986, pp. 137, 168; 1974, pp. 117-18, 213, 288-89, 303-4).

### AT plan text key

**There is no reason to vote affirmative—there is no connection between the recommendations of the 1AC and material agency.**

**Schlag ‘90** (Pierre, professor of law at the University of Colorado, Stanford Law Review, lexis, AM)

In fact, normative legal thought is so much in a hurry that it will tell you what to do even though there is not **the slightest chance** that you might actually be in a position to do it. For instance, when was the last time you were in a position to put the difference principle n31 into effect, or to restructure [\*179] the doctrinal corpus of the first amendment? "In the future**, we should.** . . ." When was the last time you were in a position to rule whether judges should become pragmatists, efficiency purveyors, civic republicans, or Hercules surrogates? Normative legal thought doesn't seem overly concerned with such worldly questions about the character and the effectiveness of its own discourse. It just goes along and proposes, recommends, prescribes, solves, and resolves. Yet despite its obvious desire to have worldly effects, worldly consequences, normative legal thought remains seemingly unconcerned that for all **practical purposes,** its only consumers are legal academics and perhaps a few law students -- persons who are virtually never in a position to put any of its wonderful normative advice into effect.

**The question of “what should be done” is the wrong question—their description of the status quo as a fixed, describable place is a lie. Talking in terms of “should” is pointless and guarantees fascism.**

**Schlag ‘91** (Pierre, Professor of Law at the University of Colorado, 139 University of Pennsylvania Law Review, April, Heinonline, AM)

For these legal thinkers, it will seem especially urgent to ask once again: 'What should be done? How should we live? What should the law be? These are the hard questions. These are the momentous questions. And they are the wrong ones. They are wrong because it is these very normative questions that reprieve legal thinkers from recognizing the extent to which the cherished "ideals" of legal academic thought are implicated in the reproduction and maintenance of precisely those ugly "realities" of legal practice the academy so routinely condemns. It is these normative questions that allow legal thinkers to shield themselves from the recognition that their work product consists largely of the reproduction of rhetorical structures by which human beings can be **coerced** into achieving ends of dubious social origin and implication. It is these very normative questions that allow legal academics to continue to address (rather lamely) bureaucratic power structures as if they were rational, morally competent, individual humanist subjects. It is these very normative questions that allow legal thinkers to assume blithely that-in a world ruled by HMOs, personnel policies, standard operating procedures, performance requirements, standard work incentives, and productivity monitoring they somehow have escaped the bureaucratic power games. It is these normative questions that enable them to represent themselves as whole and intact, as self-directing individual liberal humanist subjects at once rational, morally competent, and in control of their own situations, the captain of their own ships, the Hercules of their own empires, the author of their own texts. **It isn't so**.5 And if it isn't so, it would seem advisable to make some adjustments in the agenda and practice of legal thought. That is what I will be trying to do here. Much of what follows will no doubt seem threatening or nihilistic to many readers. In part that is because this article puts in question the very coherence, meaningfulness, and integrity of the kinds of normative disputes and discussion that almost all of us in the legal academy practice.

## Case

#### The legal system is the wrong starting point---their focus on using the law to approve Visas ignores the everyday social injustice that marginalized immigrants experience---the process of the 1AC ignores exclusion immigrants face in adjudication

Gilbert 5 (Lauren, Associate Professor of Law, St. Thomas University School of Law; J.D., University of Michigan School of Law, 1988; B.A., Harvard University, 1983., FIELDS OF HOPE, FIELDS OF DESPAIR: LEGISPRUDENTIAL AND HISTORIC PERSPECTIVES ON THE AGJOBS BILL OF 2003, lexis, Summer 2005)

Critical legal studies scholars question the underlying legitimacy of law and the lawmaking process. While process theorists would argue that laws are enacted pursuant to an informed, deliberative, and efficient process, critical legal studies scholars would contend that the lawmaking process is subjective, arational, and political. n407 In stark juxtaposition to the process theorists, critical legal theorists argue that all laws cannot be neutral because neutral laws cannot resolve the conflicts among different societal interests. Furthermore, once one acknowledges that the law is not neutral, then one must accept that each law subordinates the interests of one group in society to those of another. Critical legal scholars suggest that the "rule of law" obscures the domination of society by elite interests. n408 It also obscures the central tension within our constitutional system, which is founded [\*472] on the conflicting premises of respecting majority rule and protecting minority rights. n409 Critical legal theory thus offers a valuable critical perspective on other legisprudential theories, particularly process theories and traditional pluralism. Nonetheless, it fails to offer an adequate explanation for why progressive social reforms are enacted. If law truly is dominated by the societal elite, then how is the enactment of progressive social reforms over the last fifty years explained? As noted above, Dorothy Brown made this same point in her critique of public choice theory, arguing that Olson's theory of the free-rider effect failed to explain why public interest organizations have had such an impact on the political process over the last forty years. n410 Edward Rubin proposes a new model, the "microanalysis of institutions," which attempts to integrate institutionalist theories of lawmaking with outsider scholarship to "develop a unified scholarly discourse" on institutional behavior. n411 He defines "outsider scholarship" as a post-critical legal studies approach that uses critical race theory, feminist theory and queer theory to achieve social justice for marginalized and disempowered groups. n412 He argues that "racial minorities, women, and gay men and lesbians cannot afford the luxury of critical legal studies' fatalism; the legal system is too well entrenched to be dismissed." n413 Rather, he suggests that a deeper understanding of these structures, based on the microanalysis of institutions, can provide the basis for legal reform. Rubin suggests that a critical legal studies approach shares much in common with public choice theory. Both theories "depict institutions as either purposefully or instinctively supporting existing power structures." n414 While public choice theory would regard public institutions as rational in carrying out their strategic goals, outsider scholarship "seeks mechanisms for sensitizing these institutions to the demands of social justice." n415 Rubin's article calls for a synthesis of the various schools of legal scholarship, including the legal process school, public choice theory and critical legal studies. His proposed methodology is based on the microanalysis of institutions and a substantive focus on the interplay between efficiency and social justice considerations in the law making process. n416 [\*473] Focusing on social justice considerations for immigrants, which is particularly relevant for this Article, Kevin Johnson addresses their relative political powerlessness and the obstacles immigrant groups face in advocating for immigration reform. n417 In particular, he notes that even when non-citizens enjoy support from a majority of the electorate, they often still lose in the political and legal process because of inherent dysfunctions in lawmaking and adjudication. n418 Nonetheless, Johnson, like Brown and Rubin, recognizes that immigrant groups often enjoy the support of the advocacy community even though they are unable to participate in the electoral process. n419

#### Don’t buy their façade---the plan may seem benign, but it’s modern day slavery---guest-worker programs ensure human rights abuses---independent reason to reject their plan

SPLC 13 (Southern Poverty Law Center, Close to Slavery: Guestworker Programs in the United States, <http://www.splcenter.org/get-informed/publications/close-to-slavery-guestworker-programs-in-the-united-states>, February 2013)

In the debate over comprehensive immigration reform, various policymakers and business groups have suggested that Congress create a new or expanded guestworker program to ensure a steady supply of foreign workers for industries that rely on an abundance of cheap labor. Congress should look before it leaps. The current H-2 program, which provides temporary farmworkers and non-farm laborers for a variety of U.S. industries, is rife with labor and human rights violations committed by employers who prey on a highly vulnerable workforce. It harms the interests of U.S. workers, as well, by undercutting wages and working conditions for those who labor at the lowest rungs of the economic ladder. This program should not be expanded or used as a model for immigration reform. Under the current H-2 program overseen by the U.S. Department of Labor (DOL), employers brought about 106,000 guestworkers into this country in 2011 — approximately 55,000 for agricultural work and another 51,000 for jobs in forestry, seafood processing, landscaping, construction and other non-agricultural industries. But far from being treated like “guests,” these workers are systematically exploited and abused. Unlike U.S. citizens, guestworkers do not enjoy the most fundamental protection of a competitive labor market — the ability to change jobs if they are mistreated. Instead, they are bound to the employers who “import” them. If guestworkers complain about abuses, they face deportation, blacklisting or other retaliation. Bound to a single employer and without access to legal resources, guestworkers are routinely: Cheated out of wages Forced to mortgage their futures to obtain low-wage, temporary jobs Held virtually captive by employers or labor brokers who seize their documents Subjected to human trafficking and debt servitude Forced to live in squalid conditions Denied medical benefits for on-the-job injuries. Former House Ways and Means Committee Chairman Charles Rangel put it this way: “This guestworker program’s the closest thing I’ve ever seen to slavery.”1